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Cash Management Considerations in Caja Rural Los Andes
Abstract
How can better management of internal financials at microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide more value to
clients? Much research has been conducted to show the usefulness of microfinance, the effects of client
behavior, the benefits of internal controls, and so on. The literature covers nearly every facet of microfinance.
However, little has been examined in regards to the financial management of MFIs.
Indeed, financial management seems more a topic of Wall Street financiers than of Bill Drayton’s
‘Changemakers’. However, MFIs, like all businesses, must manage cash flows, interest rate risk, working
capital, etc. Thus, unless the internal financials of MFIs are sound, these institutions will be unable to
effectively and sustainably scale up to serve more clients, more products, and more geographies.
This research paper seeks to examine the various financial components of the internal system of Caja Rural
Los Andes, a rural Peruvian microfinance institution (hereafter ‘CLA’), and how that system impacts its ability
to provide value to its microcredit clients.
This paper will begin with an overview of microfinance and securitization – a financial process that has been
applied to microfinance in recent years, and the original focus of this research project – and continue with a
brief account of Peruvian microfinance.
In the second half, this research paper will dive deeper into CLA’s financial accounts, and discuss the
considerations and potential opportunities for each. The paper will then discuss the framework Treasury
model that was built for CLA and methods for improving cash management at the bank. The paper will
conclude with a few suggestions and final thoughts.
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INTRODUCTION  
 
How can better management of internal financials at microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide more value 
to clients? Much research has been conducted to show the usefulness of microfinance, the effects of client 
behavior, the benefits of internal controls, and so on. The literature covers nearly every facet of 
microfinance. However, little has been examined in regards to the financial management of MFIs.  
 
Indeed, financial management seems more a topic of Wall Street financiers than of Bill Drayton’s 
‘Changemakers’. However, MFIs, like all businesses, must manage cash flows, interest rate risk, working 
capital, etc. Thus, unless the internal financials of MFIs are sound, these institutions will be unable to 
effectively and sustainably scale up to serve more clients, more products, and more geographies.  
 
This research paper seeks to examine the various financ al components of the internal system of Caja 
Rural Los Andes, a rural Peruvian microfinance institution (hereafter ‘CLA’), and how that system 
impacts its ability to provide value to its microcredit clients.  
 
This paper will begin with an overview of microfinance and securitization – a financial process that has 
been applied to microfinance in recent years, and the original focus of this research project – and continue 
with a brief account of Peruvian microfinance.  
 
In the second half, this research paper will dive de per into CLA’s financial accounts, and discuss the 
considerations and potential opportunities for each. The paper will then discuss the framework Treasury 
model that was built for CLA and methods for improving cash management at the bank. The paper will 
conclude with a few suggestions and final thoughts. 
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BIRTH OF M ICROFINANCE | YUNUS AND THE GRAMEEN BANK  
 
In 2006, the Nobel Committee recognized Dr. Muhammad Yunus for his practical solution for combating 
rural poverty in Bangladesh. By now, his achievements are legend. His “microloans,” often less than $100, 
provided women entrepreneurs with start-up capital to establish small, sustainable businesses. First 
beginning this social experiment in the 1970’s, Yunus found that such loans could play a 
disproportionately positive role in lifting families and communities out of poverty and thus established 
the “Grameen Bank,” one of the pioneer microfinance i stitutions.1 
 
The Grameen Bank, founded in 1976, revolutionized the aid sector by providing a system of aid in which 
profit-motive, instead of philanthropic-motive, played the central role. Since the first microloans were 
disbursed, microfinance has provided a profitable, sustainable, and scalable means to alleviate poverty. 
Today, the microfinance industry encompasses more than 3000 microfinance institutions around the 
world. On the ground in over 100 countries, these MFIs serve nearly 75 million people annually.2 
 
 
SCRUTINIZING M ICROFINANCE  
 
Increasingly though, this growing industry faces scrutiny from opponents who deny positive impact and 
proponents who seek verification and better understanding of its various socioeconomic benefits. The 
general understanding of microfinance’s benefits and weaknesses are presented in Appendix I. 
 
While some studies suggest that the effects of microfinance differ by household conditions, others flat-out 
reject that clients escape poverty at all and instead argue that microfinance only helps to smooth out 
consumption patterns.3 4  Though, to rebut, a CGAP research note finds that e poor do value 
                                                   
1  The New York Times. "Microfinance." The New York Times. N.p., n.d. Web. 1 Dec. 2012. 
<http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/m/microfinance/index.html>. 
 
2 "MIX Market." MIX Market. N.p., n.d. Web. 1 Dec. 2012. <http://www.mixmarket.org/>. 
 
3 Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Du‡flo, Rachel Glennerst, and Cynthia Kinnan. The miracle of micro…nance? Evidence from a 
randomized evaluation. Second Version ed. Cambridge: Poverty Action Lab, 2009. Print. 
 
4 Morduch, Jonathan . Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? New Evidence from Flagship Programs in Bangladesh. 
Stanford: Stanford University, 1998. Print. 
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microfinance and its smoothing-out effects very much. In other words, microfinance may be valuable to 
the poor for many reasons, even if it does not live up to the hype.5 
 
Meanwhile, difficulties arise in developing metrics to measure impact and changes in quality of life. 
Indeed, the word ‘impact’ itself has been hard to define. For example, a typical indicator of client ad 
MFI health has been the average size of a loan. However, larger credit lines may simply indicate 
increased consumption, rather than a more productive business or increased savings. Further, if clients 
continue borrowing from informal sources on the side, they may actually find themselves more indebted 
and in worse financial condition than had they not b rrowed at all.6 And while industry leaders such as 
Grameen have developed metrics such as the Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI), the industry at large 
has been slow to adopt a measure universally.7 
 
On a separate note, actors in microfinance generally agree that understanding clients and putting clients’ 
needs first – ‘client-centered microfinance’ – is imperative as the industry continues to mature. Betwe n 
the initial disbursement of microcredits and the prsumed outcome of poverty alleviation, MFIs need to 
start providing a host of business and entrepreneur support programs. Lending microcredit to start a 
business does not mean that that business will be succe sful and raise the entrepreneur’s quality of life. 
Entrepreneurs must start successful businesses to ecap  poverty. Hence, a litany of small business 
support services must be provided by institutions specializing in a spectrum of support areas.8 
 
Further discussion of whether or not microfinance ahieves all of the suggested benefits and suffers from
the alleged shortcomings is beyond the scope of this research. It would be worth acknowledging, however, 
the endless inventory of success stories and the robust growth of this industry internationally. In many 
instances, microfinance has been wildly successful, even in areas where other forms of aid have proven 
impotent. Microfinance will certainly be here to stay for the foreseeable future, and grow all the while. 
 
                                                   
5 "Does Microfinance Help Poor People?." CGAP (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor). N.p., n.d. Web. 1 Aug. 2012. 
<www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.11415/>. 
 
6 Datar, Srikant , Marc Epstein, and Kristi Yuthas. "In Microfinance, Clients Must Come First." Stanford Social Innovation 
Review Winter (2008): 38-45. Print. 
 
7 "Progress out of Poverty: Measuring Progress. Managing Results.." Progress out of Poverty. N.p., n.d. Web. 1 Aug. 2012. 
<http://progressoutofpoverty.org/>. 
 
8 Datar, Srikant , Marc Epstein, and Kristi Yuthas. "In Microfinance, Clients Must Come First." Stanford Social Innovation 
Review Winter (2008): 38-45. Print. 
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‘T HE NEXT BILLION ’ 9 
 
Regardless of opinion, the wave of microfinance continues to roll along and will not likely lose 
momentum soon. As such, microfinance institutions need to determine sustainable next steps for growth.  
 
Today, microfinance tries to balance two seemingly contradictory goals. On the one hand, concern over 
‘mission drift’ has led to a renewed emphasis on Yuus-styled, social-impact-driven microfinance, while 
on the other hand, the drive to reach ‘the next billion’ people in poverty has promoted increased 
commercialization, an explosion of new business models, more products and services for microfinance 
clients, and the use of various financial instruments and transactions for MFIs.  
 
One form of commercialization, and the original topic for this research, is securitization.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 
9 This project initially was intended to research the prospect of securitization for microfinance institutions. Since that time, the 
project has taken many twists and turns, leading me to CLA. Though this paper focuses on treasury management, I do believe it 
is worth discussing some findings regarding my initial research topic and why I ultimately diverged from this topic. 
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SECURITIZATION IN DEVELOPED MARKETS  
 
From a virtually non-existent industry in 1970’s, when Ginnie Mae guaranteed the first mortgage-backed 
pass-through security, securitization has revolutionized the landscape of credit markets. Various types of 
assets with fixed-income characteristics including automobile loans, student loans, equipment leases, 
credit-card debt, even aircraft leases have all taken advantage of securitization. To date, the industry has 
securitized trillions of dollars’ worth of securities.101112 
 
Securitization, in the developed markets, has increased liquidity and specialization in all steps of the 
securitization process, facilitated the transfer of credit risk between parties and geographies, linked 
borrowers more closely to capital markets, allowed lenders (‘Originators’ in securitization parlance) to 
more cheaply raise capital, and enabled the building of customized products to satisfy various investors’ 
risk-return profiles over different time horizons.13 
 
Securitization has indeed been a boon for borrowers, credit lenders, ratings agencies, issuers and 
underwriters, and, of course, investors.  
 
Process of Securitization1415 
 
As the name implies, securitization involves securities: securitization ‘creates’ tradable securities by 
grouping together assets with fixed-income characteistics (overview of this process can be seen in 
Appendix II). Perhaps the most well-known securitization is that of mortgages, leading to the advent of 
the mortgage-backed security (the now infamous MBS).  
 
                                                   
10  "Asset-Backed securities in Germany: the sale and Securitization of loans by German credit institutions", Deutsche 
Bundesbank Monthly Report July, 1997.  
 
11 "Common Structures of Asset-Backed Securities and Their Risks”, Tarun Sabarwal, December 29, 2005 
 
12 Hill, Claire A., Whole Business Securitization in Emerging Markets. Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol. 
12, No. 2, 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=333008 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.333008 
 
13 Hu, Joseph. Asset securitization: theory and practice. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2011. Print. 
 
14 Kendall, Leon T., and Michael J. Fishman. A Primer on securitization. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996. Print. 
 
15   bionicturtledotcom. "bionicturtle.com - expert finance and risk." YouTube. N.p., n.d. Web. 1 Aug. 2012. 
<http://www.youtube.com/user/bionicturtledotcom 
 
7 
 
All this began back in the 1970’s (interestingly, around the same time as the Grameen Bank’s formation), 
when the pursuit of the American Dream, including the significant purchase of a home, was well under 
way. Savings and Loans banks (S&Ls) would lend out money and would acquire a mortgage (a type of 
receivable) as an asset.  
 
As demand for mortgages far exceeded banks’ supply of credit, and S&Ls suffered a crisis in liquidity, 
financial intermediaries looked to securitization t bundle together mortgage assets and sell them off for 
additional cash to lend out. These ‘Originators’, were finally able to sell home owner payables (mortgages) 
to third-party investors for cash. In return, these investors, would receive a bond-like security – with 
enough mortgages and credits that made payments monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, annually, etc., the
resulting security would effectively behave as a fixed-income asset. And as bond-like assets are much 
more liquid and easily tradable than individual mortgages (and hence offer investors easier exposure to 
previously illiquid or bulky assets like real estate mortgages), the securitization industry quickly exploded. 
 
A group of underwriters, called ‘Issuers’ in securitization, began to purchase large quantities of mortgages 
from the Originators, mash them together, provide various types of credit enhancements (discussed in the 
supplemental document titled ‘Additional Components of Securitization’), and sell these securitized 
products like bonds to investors who believed in the AAA MBSs and the, now falsified, assumption that 
the underlying homes’ property values could not declin  nationally – model risk at its finest.  
 
Over time, the industry grew to historic proportions, with several of the largest financial institutions 
holding huge positions in mortgage-backed securities. Later, the world would learn that many of these 
mortgages were of sub-prime quality and largely held r sponsible for the housing crisis of 2007.  
 
To read about additional components of securitization, see the supplemental document titled ‘Additional 
Components of Securitization.’ 
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Benefits of Securitization1617 
 
Whereas mortgages are illiquid and hard to trade, securitization allows Originators (with the help of 
investment bank ‘Arrangers’) to bundle together their r latively longer-term receivables and sell those 
receivables for cash. This helps to provide cheaper cr dit and lower risk concentration for Originators 
who can also reduce their leverage, spread out credit exposure, and decrease systemic vulnerability.  
 
Various credit enhancements help to provide higher cr dit ratings for a securitization. This higher credit 
benefits both Originators who can now access cheaper credit and investors who can now invest in an asset 
class with a credit rating that meets investment prerequisites. Tranching also helps to better match various 
levels of investor sophistication and risk appetite with an appropriate risk-reward profile. 
 
From a risk perspective, the tail risks associated with credits (e.g. prepayment and default risk) are passed 
on while funds and profits from the sale of credits are locked in the present. And, as with the Law of 
Large Numbers, bundling of large amounts of assets that pay periodically ensures that a default of the 
entire credit portfolio is unlikely and investors should receive a stream of payments in the quantity and at 
the time they expect (i.e. bundling lowers credit risk). Furthermore, securitization helps lenders increase 
liquidity: asset-backed securities can be sold as securities, making them more available for quicker sale , 
at an acceptable price, than private contracts. 
 
With receivables removed (what is known as ‘derecognition’) in exchange for cash, Originators are also 
able to inflate earnings at will. Through derecognitio , Originators can also reduce the quantity of risky 
assets on the balance sheet, thereby lessening the amount of capital they are required to hold as buffer. 
Without an increase in liabilities, but an increase in funds, Originators are able to find a cheap source of 
capital that also helps to increase ROA. 
 
Securitization also disperses capital across more geographic regions, offering more areas access to capital 
markets. Thus, securitization creates a stronger link between regions that previously experienced 
difficulty accessing credit, and investors who would be unable to invest in these regions otherwise. 
 
                                                   
16 Kendall, Leon T., and Michael J. Fishman. A Primer on securitization. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996. Print. 
 
17  Hu, Joseph. Asset securitization: theory and practice. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2011. Print. 
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Finally, as an added note, Originators oftentimes bcome the servicer for the mortgages which have been
securitized. This is a natural transition for Originators who understand and know borrowers and also help 
to further boost their profitability. 
 
Benefits of Securitization in Microfinance 
 
Though there are many unique benefits to securitization, the microfinance market, fundamentally the 
poor’s debt market, has not leveraged the advantages of securitization – the industry has barely changed 
its basic financial procedures over the past 30 years. Still today, nearly 100 million potential borrowers 
and 500 million micro-entrepreneurs worldwide lack credit access; in other figures, less than 10% of 600 
million families living on $2 per day have access financial services. Demand for credit reaches 50 billion 
dollars annually, growing 15-30% each year.18 
 
Yet, oftentimes as a result of poor government policy on microfinance, many MFIs do not have deposit 
taking functions, one of the cheapest sources of capital for banks. Meanwhile, donations and philanthropy 
have been unable to keep up with the demand for credit. Securitization offers a method for MFIs to clear 
their balance sheets, access cheap cash, and continue to expand their businesses. Whereas MFIs may be 
hard pressed to sell (let’s say) the loan of an indiv dual woman’s fruit stand, securitization enables MFIs 
to offer securities that capital markets are much more familiar with.  
 
Aside from credit access, microcredit-backed securities also have a number of characteristics which 
supplement investor portfolios. Risk-adjusted returns in microfinance are higher due to low default rates, 
microfinance clients’ higher return on assets, and  downward bias towards microfinance-related products. 
Further, these securities are largely uncorrelated with other bonds, stocks, and macroeconomic and 
country risks, making them a good hedging asset in investment portfolios. 
 
Considering the benefits to both microfinance providers and investors in capital markets, MFIs moved 
towards taking advantage of the benefits of securitizat on in recent years with several groundbreaking 
transactions, as reviewed in Appendix III. However, though there was much enthusiasm for quicker 
commercialization of microfinance, the frequency of securitizations in MFIs has since decreased.  
 
 
                                                   
18 Bystrom, Hans . The Microfinance Collateralized Debt Obligation: a Modern Robin Hood?. Lund: Lund University, 2006. 
Print. 
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DIFFICULTIES OF SECURITIZATION IN M ICROFINANCE  
 
Securitization does provide a potential solution to credit access for MFIs. However, a number of difficult 
problems have come to light over time. 
 
Securitization requires a large volume of underlying securities – here, microcredits – to achieve the scale. 
Furthermore, a liquid market for these microcredit-backed securities must exist before adoption by the 
broader investor community. When compared to the markets for mortgage-backed securities and other 
asset-backed securities, microcredit-backed securities are neither sizable, nor liquid. 
 
Further complicating the adoption of microcredit-backed securities is the lack of credit ratings for MFIs 
and the securities that they issue. Though there are initiatives by major players – such as Fitch Ratings, 
Merrill Lynch, among others – and minor players to develop widely accepted and sound ratings, investors 
are a long way from viewing microcredit-backed securities on par with other fixed-income assets.1920 
 
And from a purely pragmatic standpoint, a lack of standardization and transparency of securitization in 
microfinance hinders the industry from adopting theprocess more broadly. Documentation, types of 
enhancements, even methods of collecting payments for investors in various tranches, are not consistent 
across the industry. This makes understanding a securitization and conducting due diligence especially 
difficult for potential investors.  
 
Commoditization of Clientele 
 
Perhaps most concerning, securitization takes commercialization of microfinance a step further by 
commoditizing microcredit clients and, in many ways, represents the idea of client drift. Though 
securitization itself has not necessarily been accused of eroding mission-centric microfinance, its 
tendency to commercialize MFI and be used by commercially-minded MFIs makes it a target of 
criticism.21 
                                                   
 
19 "Fitch's microfinance methodology." Euroweek 1058 (2008): N/A. Print 
 
20 O'Connor, Colleen . "Merrill Grabs New Microfinance Tool." Investment Dealers' Daily N/A (2006): 9. Print. 
 
21 Special Session: Profiting from the Poor? A Discussion on Microfinance IPOs. Clinton Global Initiative. 21 Sept. 2010. 
Television. 
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In an abstract sense, Originators effectively ‘sell their clients’ through securitization. And, similar to the 
housing bubble in the United States, Originators may become less concerned about the quality of credit 
and quality of life of the client, and more concerned with creating loan volume for securitizations. 
 
In this rush to tap capital markets, client relationships may be eroded as borrowers become commodities 
in the financial system.  
 
 
FIRST, LOOK WITHIN  
 
Understandably, many look for a quick fix to structural problems. In the case of microfinance, difficulty 
in accessing credit markets pushes MFIs to consider financial processes such as securitization. However, 
before looking outwards to capital markets, it is worth considering how we can optimize internal financi l 
management and tap existing potential.  
 
Instead of asking ourselves how we can scale up MFIs, it may be more meaningful to take a more 
balanced position and consider how to increase financial inclusion, while simultaneously holding true to 
client-centered microfinance. Specifically, there are opportunities in treasury management, working 
capital management, asset-liability management, liquid ty and cash management, along with other strains 
of financial management. 
 
Following, this paper will consider Peruvian microfinance and its major actors and idiosyncrasies. 
Afterwards, this paper will delve deeper into CLA’s major financial accounts, and discuss problems and 
potential explanations for each. The paper will then move on to a discussion of the model that was built
for CLA and methods for improving cash management at the bank.  
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STRONG FOUNDATIONS FOR PERUVIAN M ICROFINANCE  
 
In Peru, politicians, regulators, MFIs, credit bureaus, among other players got microfinance right. Unlike 
many countries in which microfinance has tried to take root, Peru has eagerly embraced free markets, 
notably during the Fujimori era, and has established infrastructure that supports high-quality credit 
creation. As a result of sound regulatory infrastructure, a free market environment, and a strong focus on 
social mission, Peru is one of the most ideal natios n which to implement microfinance programs.22 
 
Like all things, microfinance differs around the world in terms of regulations, type of liability schem , 
products and services offered, and nearly every other facet of the industry. For example, Peruvian MFIs 
typically rely on individual liability as opposed to Grameen’s group liability and, unlike many other 
countries, Peru allows MFIs to take deposits from the public. Furthermore, there is a strong focus on 
savings, alongside credit creation, due to Germany’s influence on Peruvian microfinance when the 
industry was first laying its foundations.23 
 
Peru also distinguishes itself with its various types of microfinance institutions, its nondiscriminaton 
between domestic and foreign capital, little intervention by the state, and freedom to determine prices (e.g. 
interest rates and commissions). These positive regulatory idiosyncrasies have also led to increased 
transparency, persistently pushing Peruvian microfinance’s PAR30 above that of other Latin American 
microfinance markets.24 
 
A strong social mission also drives Peru’s microfinance industry. While Peru’s coastal areas have 
experienced substantial loan, deposit, and overall conomic growth, southern and rural regions have been 
scarred by years of terrorism by the likes of Shining Path, hyperinflation that destroyed household wealth, 
and socioeconomic marginalization.25 As such, there have been efforts to redistribute wealth from 
developed cities (especially those along the coast) to rural regions; indeed, there is a certain welfar  
mentality in regions that have received redistributed wealth – some microfinance clients require 
additional guidance to better grasp the process of credit repayment.26 
                                                   
22 Intelligence Unit, The Economist. Global microscope on the microfinance business enviro ment 2010. N/A: Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2010. Print. 
 
23 Social Investments AG, responsAbility. "Peru - Model Market for Microfinance." Research Insight March (2012): 1-9. Print. 
 
24 Ibid. 
 
25 Ibid. 
 
26  Ramos-Velita, Rosanna. Phone interview. Aug. 2012. 
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There is much work to be done in rebuilding rural Peru, but microfinance has proven itself to be a 
powerful tool for development in these areas and has accompanied economic development in Peru. 
Microfinance is so prominent that some estimates show that micro-companies account for 9% of 
companies in Peru and employ 84% of the working population.27 
 
Keeping Firms Honest: the SBS 
 
Perhaps the most astute creation for Peruvian microfinance was Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros del 
Perú, or the SBS. As the chief overseer and regulator of financial firms, the SBS determines liquidity 
requirements, capital requirements, reserve requirements, among other key metrics of financial regulation. 
Firms are also required to report to the SBS weekly, and offer information on certain metrics daily. And 
while these regulations, among many others, are quite stringent, they have slowed down the rush to 
commercialized microfinance, allowing firms to take steady, but solid, steps forward in the Peruvian 
microfinance industry.28  
 
The types of financial firms that exist, and the requirements to become a certain type of financial 
institution, are also determined by the SBS. The SBS classifies financial institutions into Banks, Finance 
Companies, Municipal Microfinance Institutions (CMACs), Rural Microfinance Institutions (CRACs), 
and EDPYMEs (small business lenders). Each of these institutions has their own regulatory requirements 
in formation, operations, financials, and a host of other considerations throughout the firms’ life cycles.29 
 
The SBS creates a clear regulatory environment for mic ofinance and financial institutions – an important 
addition to largely informal economy – and also serves as an enforcer for these prudent regulations. As 
such, regulatory risk is reduced, while MFIs are compelled to remain transparent and honest with their 
financial reporting. 
 
 
 
                                                   
 
27 BBVA. "The Future of Microfinance in Peru" Forum, organized by the BBVA Microfinance Foundation, has t ken place in 
Lima." Fundación Microfinanzas: BBVA. N.p., n.d. Web. 1 Aug. 2012. <http://www.mfbbva.org/english/prensa/historic-
news/archive/2009//select_category/2/article/42/132.html?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[fech]=2009&cHash=dd2d1fc835>. 
 
28 Ramos-Velita, Rosanna. Personal interview. 15 May 2012. 
 
29 For an overview of these regulations, and a more detailed description of these financial entities, pleas  see: ‘Microfinance 
Regulation in Peru: Current State, Lessons Learned an  Prospects for the Future’ by Alfredo Ebentreich (April 2005). 
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Keeping Borrowers Honest: Credit Bureaus 
 
While the SBS maintains a stringent eye on MFIs, credit bureaus help keep borrowers honest. Borrowers 
are rated as Normal, With Potential Problems, Deficient, Doubtful, and Loss depending on the status of 
their credit (e.g. number of days past due) and the typ  of credit the client owes (e.g. Commercial, 
Microenterprise, Consumer, Mortgage, etc.). Firms are then required to adjust their balance sheets to 
reflect any changes in asset quality.30 
 
Thanks to credit bureaus, all MFIs are able to keep track of all microfinance clients’ credit scores – 
whether or not those individuals are direct clients to a particular MFI. As such, clients are compelled to 
pay back their credits in a timely manner in order to receive additional credits from any MFI in the future. 
And as MFIs can see a client’s credit history, it is less likely that these organizations will extend too much 
credit and over-indebt clients. Though, it is worth noting that not all clients fully understand the extent 
they may be impacted by credit bureaus’ presence in the marketplace; meanwhile, competition between 
MFIs may lead institutions to disregard the risks of client over-indebtedness.  
 
Credit bureaus essentially lessen the asymmetric information that clients would otherwise hide from MFIs 
when requesting a loan. This supports tremendous tran parency in the industry and sets up a platform f 
future innovations in Peruvian microfinance (including, potentially, the introduction of securitization, as 
mentioned above). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
30 Ebentreich, Alfredo. Microfinance Regulation in Peru: Current State, Lessons Learned and Prospects for the Future. College 
Park: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2005. Print. 
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ENTER CAJA RURAL LOS ANDES 
 
It is in this environment that CLA finds itself. Ms. Rosanna Ramos-Velita, a graduate of Penn’s Lauder 
graduate program and the President of the Board of Directors at CLA has championed mission-centric 
microfinance with tremendous results. 
 
After an equity injection in CLA from an investment consortium, Ms. Ramos-Velita and the Board 
restructured senior management, implemented cultural changes, and developed and implemented strong 
growth strategies. After a number of years’ hard work, Caja Rural Los Andes now has more than 22,000 
clients, over 20 offices and affiliated branches, and  default rate of less than 4%. 
 
Perhaps most importantly, CLA continues to focus on the rural regions of southern Peru, agricultural 
loans, and women borrowers. The bank also offers and develops various types of savings products to 
complement its credit products. Though CLA’s focus on mission leads to more demanding work (credit 
officers begin work at 4AM to visit clients) and dampens growth (although, the bank has still experienced 
over 30% annualized ROE per quarter in recent quarters), the bank makes a real impact in the quality of 
life for its clients that can be evidenced from site visits to client businesses and homes. 
 
As CLA assesses its options to accelerate growth, its client-focus ensures that clients will never be ‘sold 
out’. Rather, CLA seeks to better understand its financial accounts, optimize its internal systems, and
build a treasury model to forecast future trends. By increasing financial efficiency, the bank will beable 
to squeeze out more cash, find cheaper credit to meet its financing needs, provide more products and 
services, and ultimately scale up. 
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Cash Management: An Illustration 
 
One morning, Jimmy and Derlin, my boss and his assistant, were dressed in jeans and hoodies. They 
asked me if I wanted to join them and visit an office n Ilave. That’s random, I thought. But hey, why not? 
The three of us got into a cab. Jimmy wasn’t carrying anything, but Derlin was holding onto a backpack. 
After a while, I asked what Derlin was carrying. Derlin gave me a serious look and said something that 
included ‘luego’ (later) and ‘en Ilave’ (in Ilave).  
 
When we finally got to the Ilave office, we shuffled to a back office area behind the counter. Derlin put 
down the backpack and started taking out stacks and stacks of Soles. Jimmy explained to me that the Ilave 
office had run out of cash. We had gone on the trip to manually transfer cash from the Puno office to the 
Ilave office.  
 
Cash is the lifeblood of a firm that lends and receives capital. Offices need an ample supply of cash to not 
only meet withdrawal and credit extension needs, but also withstand various types of liquidity shocks. 
Simultaneously, holding too much cash, a result of some combination of too little credit extension and too 
much deposit inflow, leads to over-liquidity for whic  firms may pay a cost. For example, if a depositor 
expects 9% per $1 of stored Plazo Fijo (a fixed term deposit account), yet that dollar is not being lent out 
in the form of a credit, the firm experiences a 9% cost on the Plazo Fijo account with no offsetting icome. 
 
Hence, on the asset side, banks lend out credit and pro ucts that clients desire in order to effectively 
utilize the financing it receives. Meanwhile, on the liabilities side, banks create combinations of financing 
(e.g. checking accounts, credit lines, etc.) that addresses the needs of clients and maintains a low weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC). In this way, banks earn a spread and become sustainable – borrowing at 
a low rate from the public and private credit lines, and lending to the public at higher interest rate 
microcredits.  
 
Liabilities Fund Assets 
 
Currently, CLA’s WACC – taking into account capital requirements, liquidity, and reserve costs – 
amounts to roughly 10%. CLA then lends this cumulative basket of funds to microfinance borrowers.  
 
Yet different assets and liabilities display characteristically different behaviors – reflecting differing 
underlying client behavior. For example, the averag woman who saves in a checking account is different 
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from the average woman who saves in a fixed-term deposit account, just as the average woman who 
borrowers an agricultural loan is different from the average woman who borrows a small business loan.  
 
The volatility, stickiness, turnover, duration, etc. of accounts vary from one to the next. As such, by 
separately managing different accounts, and better understanding the idiosyncrasies of various account 
types, the bank may be better able to match assets and liabilities, effectively match durations to immunize 
against interest rate risk, and potentially even hedge various other risks.   
 
First, Understand Clients 
 
To do all this, however, CLA must understand its clients from all angles: who, what, when where, why, 
and how? By understanding clients, the bank will be a le to understand the trends it sees in its various 
accounts, thus enabling superior analysis, forecasting, and back-testing capabilities. As this paper does 
not presume to comprehensively understand the bank’s clients – indeed, this would be an effort in and of 
itself – we instead look at the accounts as they ar, highlight findings, and try to build an elementary 
treasury model based on the information we do have. 
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ASSETS 
 
As with all banks, CLA is in the business of borrowing from the public in the form of low-cost savings 
accounts and fixed term deposits, and lending to the public in the form of higher-interest loan products.  
 
While CLA holds more than S/. 100M in assets, more than 75% are in the form of credits, and the lion 
share of the remainder lies in cash and cash equivalents. Clearly, the primary business of CLA, an MFI, is 
microcredits: nearly all of CLA’s roughly S/. 12.5M in revenue is derived from interest payments.  
 
Roughly 60% of loans are Agropecuarios (agricultura), 22% are Pymes (small-business loans), 10% are 
Convenio (private contracts), with the remainder in co tra-deposit, charity products, among others. Most 
loan sizes lie between 2001-5000 S/. (28%), 5001-10,000 S/. (26%), and 10,001-20,000 S/. (21%). Time 
to maturity on most loans is generally 1 year (40%), 2 years (35%), or 3 years (11%). Finally, as one 
might expect, the region with most of CLA’s loans is Puno (79%), followed by Ayacucho (16%). 
Breakdowns of the loan characteristics can be found in Appendix IV. CLA essentially has two main credit 
products: one and two year agricultural loans, across a number of different sizes.31  
 
All CLA locations are able to extend loans and receive interest payments; Banco de Credito – Peru’s 
largest bank by network size – is also able to receiv  interest payments on behalf of CLA.  
 
Los Andes also moves capital quickly. As 10% of credits turnover per month, Los Andes has an implicit 
120% annual turnover rate. If Los Andes does not renew credits or find new clients at a quick enough rate, 
Los Andes will incur over-liquidity costs as discussed above. 
 
Default Rates 
 
Default rates across all loans amounts to about 4% - an achievement for any institution. CLA takes its 
social mission seriously and commits itself to lending responsibly and not over-indebting its clients. Los 
Andes’ credit analysts also conduct extraordinary work – building close relationships with clients 
throughout rural Peru and supporting clients throughout the loan process. 
 
                                                   
31 We did not examine, however, the overlap between type, size, maturity, and region of loan. As such, it is unclear whether 
certain metrics may be correlated, or biased towards, certain other metrics. For example, perhaps all of the 1 year loans are 
agricultural, while 2 year loans primarily consist of Pymes contracts. 
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However, understanding underlying drivers for repayment in microfinance remains an elusive task. While 
the United States has the ‘5 Cs of Credit’ – Characte , Capacity, Collateral, Capital, Conditions – credit in 
developing markets are driven by different factors that serve as proxies for the 5 Cs. An elementary list 
based on a literature review of the subject can be found in Appendix V. 
 
The Effect of Credit Bureaus 
 
While is it clear that credit bureaus help to reduce asymmetric information, keep clients honest, and vert 
client over-indebtedness, they also foster interesting competitive dynamics amongst microfinance lenders.  
 
Because client records are publically available to microfinance through credit bureaus, lenders have a 
good idea of which clients display preferable credit behavior. As such, competing banks may pursue CLA
clientele to extend more loans. In this way, CLA serves as a ‘screening’ institution of sorts – once cli nts 
have proven creditworthiness through Los Andes loans, other banks may step in with more credit, leading 
to risks of over-indebtedness.  
 
While this does occur, CLA’s close relationship with clients fosters loyalty. 70% of clients are unique to 
Los Andes and 30% have been with Los Andes for more than 3 years. And while CLA has forayed into 
pursuing other banks’ customers, CLA quickly found that these clients exhibited weaker performance 
than those clients that received their first microfinance loan from CLA. Los Andes has since largely 
discontinued these operations.  
 
Los Andes also actively promotes loyalty and retention amongst its current clients. A recent Wharton 
graduate, Elena Boyd, committed much of her time with Los Andes’ credit group developing a ‘rewards 
program’ for responsible, long-term clients. 
 
Credits Make a Difference 
 
Summer analysts at Los Andes had the opportunity to visit a number of clients who received microcredits. 
One client account in particular was an Uros husband and wife who borrowed a small amount of money 
to purchase a boat rudder.  
 
Now, this is a couple who looks like they’re in their 60s, and before this loan were taking two oars and 
paddling around Lake Titicaca for hours every day, moving between different islands, making a living 
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spreading out fish nets. And, once the husband and wife had a large enough catch, they would row all the 
way to Puno’s shores. For context, it took the newly upgraded motor boat (with the microfinanced rudder) 
nearly 2 hours to reach shore. I can only imagine the length of time it would take using oars alone. 
 
These credits have made a difference in lives through t Peru’s rural southeast region. But in order 
expand Los Andes’ operations, the bank must find an effective financing mix to make all of this feasible. 
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L IABILITIES – PUBLIC OBLIGATIONS  
 
For banks, liabilities primarily include obligations to the public and private credit lines. These serve as 
banks’ sources of financing and the components of any financing mix.  
 
Out of roughly S/. 95M, more than S/. 75M are considered public obligations – another S/. 20M are in the 
form of Aduedos, long-term credit lines. Public obligations are split into two main categories – Ahorro 
Normal and Plazo Fijo. Ahorro Normal accounts are ch cking accounts in which CLA clients may deposit 
and withdrawal cash at will. Being CLA’s most liquid and volatile account, Ahorro Normal offers clients 
a low 2.20% interest rate (weighted average across all Ahorro Normal deposits).  
 
Plazo Fijo accounts are effectively fixed-term deposits with maturities ranging from 60 days, 90 days, 120 
days, 180 day, 360 days, 390 days, 450 days, 720 days, 1080 days, 1440 days, to 1880 days. In all, Plazo 
Fijo offers clients a weighted average interest rate of 9.50%. 
 
Ahorro Normal and Plazo Fijo represent the bulk of liabilities, commanding S/. 9M (12%) and S/. 58M 
(77%) in the public obligation accounts, respectively. The remaining public obligations primarily include 
CTS, which are accounts for employee wages (almost exclusively used by CLA staff) at S/. 3M (4%), and 
Garantia which consist of various contingent related obligations, at S/. 1.5M (2%). 
 
Interestingly, the bulk of liabilities are in Plazo Fijo accounts, while a smaller component lies in Ahorro 
Normal. Yet, the number of clients using Plazo Fijo is nly around 3,500, compared to Ahorro Normal’s 
roughly 11,300 users. The average Plazo Fijo account size (S/. 16,600) is thus several factors above the 
average Ahorro Normal account size (S/. 800). This reflects a difference in the underlying clientele, a fact 
which we will explore further below. 
 
WACC: Brief Introduction  
 
Public obligations and credit lines are financing sources for banks, while the interest rate on these sources 
is the bank’s cost of capital. Building an efficient mix of these sources of financing though can be tricky. 
Whereas the decision of which microcredit type to extend is largely guided by client need and firm 
mission (e.g. agricultural vs. small business), the type of public obligation account to promote is a 
function of broader considerations. 
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For example, banks are always trying to lower their Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) – the 
weighted average of all interest rates (the bank’s co ts) banks provide to client capital (the public 
obligation financing source) to lower the interest ra e required of clients that borrow credits (or, 
alternatively, to widen their interest rate spread). If WACC was the CLA’s only consideration, they would 
exclusively offer checking accounts which provide th lowest interest rates to clients and, therefore, l w 
cost financing for CLA.  
 
Liability-Side: Other Considerations 
 
As one would expect, however, WACC is not the only consideration. Checking accounts provide cheap 
credit but are quite volatile, leading to liquidity shocks when clients become active en mass. Fixed income 
deposits, on the other hand, provide long-term stability, but are much more expensive. These two 
accounts also address different needs between clients who seek checking account liquidity versus fixed-
term deposit interest and security.  
 
Thus, while CLA must lower WACC to lower microcredit interest rates (and maintain spread), they must 
also consider client needs, liquidity and duration of liabilities, and the broader social goals of thebank. 
All of this must be taken into account as CLA formulates an ideal financing mix.32  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
32 I am unaware of potential issues with extending maturities on loans that clients are able to pay on a short-term basis. For 
example, if a client is able to repay a loan in 6 months, what are the negative consequences in extending that loan to 8 months? It 
would be interesting to understand the marginal benefit of increasing maturity by 1 month versus decreasing maturity by 1 month. 
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AHORRO NORMAL  
 
As Los Andes’ checking account service, Ahorro Normal provides the bulk of clients to whom the bank 
owes interest. Interestingly, while the number of clients is increasing, the total amount of funds in Ahorro 
Normal has been decreasing over time. This implies that old clients are pulling funds out faster than new 
clients are putting funds in. 
 
It is unclear why this has been occurring. One potential explanation is that clients in Ahorro Normal are 
seeking more exposure to fixed-term deposits, as in Plazo Fijo, and moving funds out of Ahorro Normal. 
While there has not been a formal inquiry into the ov rlap between Ahorro Normal and Plazo Fijo clients, 
the bank estimates roughly 15% overlap between the two client bases. This is already a substantial level 
of overlap which also creates a number of possibilities which will be discussed below. 
 
Stickiness 
 
As a checking account product, Ahorro Normal is naturally volatile. The question then becomes – how 
volatile? What is the ‘stickiness’ of this type of account; how long do clients leave funds untouched? 
 
In general, Los Andes maintains long-term relationship  with its clients, making checking account 
products a longer-term engagement. Indeed, I have seen Los Andes’ relationship-building in progress. 
Kike, one of Puno’s onsite credit managers invites dozens of clients into his office each and every day to 
hear their concerns, alleviate their stress, and offer solutions. And, occasionally, Kike and other memb rs 
of the Los Andes team will go on a ‘road show’ of srt  to meet with potential women savers and walk 
them through the savings process, interest rates, and good consumer spending habits. Indeed, at one such 
gathering in Juliaca, hundreds of women from rural locales gathered to learn about the Ahorro Normal 
product, the savings process, and voice their concerns. 
 
           
          Kike in Juliaca          Lorena, Mr. Washington in Juliaca  CLA Roadshow in Juliaca  
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From a more pragmatic standpoint, Los Andes does not issue debit cards or enable use of ATMs. 
Therefore, volatility through these means is nonexist nt. 
 
It is interesting, however, to consider the potential movement of clients from Ahorro Normal accounts to 
Plazo Fijo accounts. If clients are ‘sticky’ enough, Los Andes could ‘pay’ for clients’ liquidity and reduce 
volatility by offering clients the opportunity to move from low rate Ahorro Normal to the higher rates of 
Plazo Fijo; Los Andes would incur a higher interest cost to lock in a source of longer term, fixed liquidity. 
 
Interest Rate as a Driver for Ahorro Normal 
 
Taking a page from introductory finance, an increase in interest rates should increase the demand on the 
interest bearing products (and vice-versa). Curiously, when we ran a correlation on the interest rates 
offered each month and the amount of Ahorro Normal deposits held with Los Andes, we found a negative, 
near-perfect correlation between the two variables – a interest rates decreased, Ahorro Normal increased. 
We found similarly counter-intuitive correlations for interest rates and cost, suggesting that as interest 
rates decreases, the cost of financing Ahorro Normal accounts increased.  
 
Given that Los Andes offers competitive checking account rates compared to market peers, perhaps 
lowering interest rates has a minimal effect on client behavior. Hypothetically, whether Los Andes beats 
peers by 1% or .5%, Los Andes would still remain the dominant player and attractive to savers.  
 
Alternatively, perhaps rates don’t matter at all. Cients may simply be accessing the most local MFI and
find Los Andes satisfactory. However, given the fragmentation and competition of MFIs in Puno, and 
Peru at large, this argument is unpersuasive.  
 
Trend Analysis 
 
By viewing the inflow and outflow trends in the Ahorr  Normal accounts of Puno’s CLA office, we see a 
regular up/down pattern (see below). Blue lines represent inflow, red lines represent outflow.  
 
While this pattern is indeed rough, it comes off as far too systematic to be caused by natural factors (we 
tested the trends against weather, distance to local offices, and the like with no convincing results). 
Likewise, we tried to test for potential human behaviors that might have led to this sort of pattern. For
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example, the dates of weekly markets, common work schedules, etc., but did not find a pattern that 
consistently matched up over time to the trend we seen below. 
 
In short, we failed to find a single explanatory variable to explain both the relatively persistent trends of 
inflow and outflow in Ahorro Normal as well as the n ar identical behavior of inflow and outflow. Of 
course, these trends could be explained with a multifactor model, or a confounding variable that is 
somehow affecting both inflow and outflow simultaneously, yet independently. 
 
 
 
However, it is also very important to note that newer CLA offices display much weaker relationships than 
we see here (this graph was taken from the much more ‘mature’ office in Puno). This may suggest that as 
offices mature over time, client behavior becomes institutionalized. And whether we are able to decipher 
the underlying variables, simply having expectations for general trends is humble a step forward. 
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PLAZO FIJO 
 
CLA offers three categories of Plazo Fijo products: Platinum, Dorada (Gold), and Diamante (Diamond). 
Platinum and Dorada offer short-term fixed term products, starting at 60 days for Dorada and 90 days for 
Platinum, all the way up to 450 days for both. However, whereas Platinum allows clients to collect 
accumulated interest quarterly, Dorada does not allw clients to collect interest and instead compounds 
interest payments overtime. Diamante products are longer-term, 720 to 1800 days, and interest cannot be 
drawn. A full list of product maturities and rates can be found in Appendix VI. 
 
It is also important to note that clients who have Plazo Fijo accounts are fundamentally different from 
those who have Ahorro Normal accounts. A cursory view of these two accounts shows us that the average 
Plazo Fijo account size is around 16,000, while the av rage Ahorro Normal account size is only 800. This 
is a tremendous differential, and one that suggests a clear difference in clientele and savings purposes.  
 
Product Growth 
 
While Plazo Fijo accounts have been growing in aggre ate, different maturity Plazo Fijo accounts have 
grown at different rates in different offices for, p esumably, different reasons. As data for other offices are 
relatively limited and the vast majority of Plazo Fijo accounts are located in Puno, we focused our effo ts 
on analyzing Plazo Fijo in regards to the Puno office.  
 
In regards to product type, Dorada represents 65% of Plazo Fijo, Diamante represents 19%, and Platinum 
and other private Plazo Fijo contracts representing the remainder. As such, we will focus our attention on 
Dorada and Diamante. 
 
However, before delving into more specific analyses, we wanted to see what maturity products clients 
were especially receptive towards. To do so, we aggregated all product types and categorized the 
aggregated funds by maturity. We graphed maturities against the amount of funds, and subsequently 
overlayed the same graph over months to produce the graph below. 
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As can be seen, medium term maturities of 1-3 years h ve shown the most growth.  
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By breaking this graph down into its component product groups, we are able to see more particular trends: 
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Clearly evident is that most of the growth in accounts with maturities less than 720 days is being 
generated by the Dorada products, not Platinum. This suggests that clients who decide to purchase Plazo 
Fijo accounts are less concerned about liquidity, and more driven by interest return as Dorada does not 
allow for quarterly interest collection.  
 
The interesting point is that by juxtaposing these two products, we can get a sense of the cost of liquidity. 
Clients could purchase a Platinum Plazo Fijo account, and simply choose not to withdraw their capital or 
reinvest interest, effectively receiving compound iterest returns on their Platinum accounts. However, 
the marginally higher interest offered by Dorada, as well as the additional sense of security – that your 
funds are safe and stored away – may have been enough t  push clients from Platinum to Dorada. This 
marginally higher interest would be, in a sense, represent the ‘cost of liquidity’ needed to secure funds 
from clients, and incentivize clients to refrain from collection interest payments. 
 
Of course, marketing may have played a role if CLA more actively advertised Dorada over Platinum. 
Alternatively, clients may have simply been unaware of the difference between the two product types and 
went for the product that was ‘higher up’ on the list of product times. 
 
As a side-note, we also constructed similar graphs for the number of clients, as well as the average size of 
accounts. This may help us better uncover the underlying drivers for the various trends we see above. 
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Number of Clients: 
 
 
 
Average Account Sizes: 
 
 
 
With these graphs, we may get a better understanding of why the total size of accounts are increasing or 
decreasing – whether it is a result of increased (decreased) client number, or increased (decreased) 
account size. We have also broke-down these charts by product as can be found in Appendix VII. 
 
Searching for Trends: Short-Term Plazo Fijo  
 
As with the Ahorro Normal accounts, we tested to see if interest rates affected Plazo Fijo account size. 
For short-term maturities, interest rates had an inverse correlation with total account size while longer-
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specifically, for Diamante accounts, we found a strong positive correlation between interest rates and 
account size, cost, and number of clients. The relationships found for Diamante are much more consistent 
with our traditional understanding of interest rates affects than those that we found for Ahorro Normal 
and short-term Plazo Fijo. 
 
For short-term Plazo Fijo, a similar analysis to Ahorro Normal may apply. Perhaps due to Los Andes’ 
competitive rates, marginal movements in interest rates do not strongly affect consumer behavior.  
 
Alternatively, we reasoned, perhaps there was a ‘threshold effect’ that might affect consumer behavior. 
For example, the difference between 9.2% and 9.1% might not trigger a response from clients. However, 
a drop from 9.0% to 8.9% might elicit a shift in preferences as the interest rate has crossed the 9.0% 
‘threshold’. We found no meaningful difference in the size and speed of funds moving in and out of Plazo 
Fijo when rates broke through seemingly reasonable ‘thresholds’ (albeit, these ‘thresholds’ were 
arbitrarily determined).  
 
A final factor, we reasoned, could be that since the Peruvian market held much liquidity, interest rates 
may not matter, so long as consumers are able to capture yield. However, this would run counter to what 
we reasoned for Diamante products – that consumers ar , indeed, sensitive to yields. Though, a situation 
in which consumers are not interest rate sensitive in the 1-3 years case, but are sensitive in the 5+ years 
case could exist.  
 
Of course, clients may be purchasing Plazo Fijo accounts for reasons wholly unrelated to interest rates. 
For example, clients could be purchasing Plazo Fijo for the simple reasons that they are currently clients 
in Ahorro Normal and are engaging with Los Andes’ other product offerings. Again, it is important to 
understand the overlap between Ahorro Normal and Plazo Fijo clients to get a better handle on these 
types of relationships.  
 
Searching for Trends: Long-Term Plazo Fijo 
 
As noted above, we found strong, positive correlation between interest rates and Diamante account sizes, 
interest costs, and number of clients.  
 
As the maturity on the Plazo Fijo product increases, clients may become increasingly aware of their loss 
of liquidity. As such, clients may become correspondingly sensitive to interest rates. This would fallin 
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line with our understanding of the term structure and the liquidity premium demanded by credit lenders 
(in this case, Los Andes clients), as time horizons increase.  
 
Region of Origination 
 
Los Andes has no real account of where new Plazo Fijo account deposits are coming from. However, 
conventional knowledge suggests that many of the new cli nts are originating from Lima and other more 
developed regions of Peru. This may explain the widely ifferent client profiles of those with Plazo Fijo 
accounts and Ahorro Normal accounts. And as Los Andes does not offer debit or ATM-compatible types 
of cards, Ahorro Normal is indeed limited to clients who can transact in local CLA offices or Banco de 
Credito branches.  
 
Furthermore, where Los Andes draws clients from also speaks to the success of its social initiatives. If 
Los Andes draws clients primarily from areas outside of rural Peru, then it is questionable whether, in th s 
case, Plazo Fijo addresses the needs of rural clients instead of simply providing strong interest retuns for 
investors in developed regions. 
 
This, however, must still be examined in more detail before any conclusions can be drawn.  
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AHORRO NORMAL / PLAZO FIJO INTERPLAY 
 
As noted above, Plazo Fijo makes up the largest portion of liabilities while Ahorro Normal makes up the 
largest proportion of clients. At the same time, Plazo Fijo accounts offer superior rates of interest while 
also accounting for the largest portion of financial cost (roughly 80%). Ahorro Normal makes up the 
remainder of the cost (around 20%). These two accounts create an interesting relationship and potential 
synergies that should be mentioned. 
 
Lowering Cost, but with Trade-Offs 
 
As Ahorro Normal has a lower cost compared to Plazo Fij , a marginal increase in Ahorro Normal will 
decrease Los Andes’ weighted average cost of capital. This allows for a number of possibilities, including 
larger spreads, increased turnover, new products offerings, and extended maturities. 
 
However, two issues arise. First, both Plazo Fijo and Ahorro Normal serve two distinct sets of clients. A  
such, the social benefits provided by both products mu t be considered – whether it is more ‘socially 
beneficial’ to promote an additional dollar, or client, in Ahorro Normal versus Plazo Fijo.  
 
Second, a liquidity issue arises. By burgeoning Ahorro Normal, liquidity becomes more volatile relative 
to an equivalent increase in Plazo Fijo – the degree of this change will depend on the ‘stickiness’ of 
Ahorro Normal, which must be examined further. As such, Los Andes must determine whether the 
tradeoff in lower costs and changes in mission targets compensates for an increase in liquidity volatility. 
 
Overlap Potential: Contra-Deposits as an Example  
 
An estimated 15% of clients have both Ahorro Normal and Plazo Fijo accounts. A number of interesting 
possibilities arise due to this large amount of clients who utilize both short-term deposits and longer-term 
fixed-term deposits. One possibility in particular is joint products. 
 
Lorena Cabrera Brugal, another summer intern with Los Andes, focused part of her time on creating 
products that would extend the scope of Los Andes’ social mission. Specifically, after meeting with 
clients in several hard to reach locales, Lorena proposed a contra-deposit account for women savers. 
Oftentimes, women save to pay for their children’s education and, while a savings account is a 
meaningful step towards that goal, a loan focused on education would drastically supplement these efforts. 
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Lorena proposed the following product. Women would take a portion of their current Ahorro Normal 
account and freeze that cash in an escrow-type account f r a one-year term. Whereas Ahorro Normal 
offers a rate around 2%, these escrow accounts would offer an interest rate of around 4% and serve as 
collateral for loans roughly twice the size of the escrow, at around 22% interest.  
 
Unfortunately, initial feedback from members of themanagement team was hesitant. There was fear that 
the contra-deposit product’s spread was far too small. After some discussion, the problem became clear.  
 
Los Andes typically aggregates all of its financing to ether into one pool of lendable capital. The WACC 
of this pool, including various extraneous costs, comes out to roughly 10%. As such, when evaluating the 
new contra-deposit product, the spread was around 12% (before taking into account various 
miscellaneous costs) – far less than any other product Los Andes was currently offering.  
 
After much back and forth, we realized that we could make the product work by splitting up the sources 
of financing. Instead of looking at the contra-deposit product as being financed at 10%, and returning 
22%, Los Andes could interpret the financing rate to be 4% (the rate on the contra-deposit) with the 
product still garnering 22%. The spread was therefore amplified by 6%, to 18% – 50% larger than the 
spread from the previous view. This larger spread ws enough to push the management team to view the 
contra-deposit product as feasible.  
 
A Shift in Perspective 
 
What we had, effectively, done was move a client from a 2% Ahorro Normal account to a 4% one-year 
maturity Plazo Fijo account (the escrow).  
 
But, in this case, unlike the discussions above, we were able to capture the best of three worlds. Firt, Los 
Andes was able to purchase client liquidity for only 2%, a much cheaper rate than had the bank tried to 
shift Ahorro Normal clients to any other Plazo Fijo account independently. Second, we lowered the cost 
of capital for this particular type of loan from 10% to 4%, a 600 basis points decrease in financing costs – 
simply by splitting up the funding sources, breaking up the aggregate pool of funds. Finally, Los Andes 
was able to take a step towards a new microfinance frontier – funding education through microcredits. 
 
Of course, the bank’s overall cost of financing (aside from the mental-gymnastics) increases, as we hav
taken a previously 2% account and locked it up intoa 4% escrow (or, more positively, Plazo Fijo). But 
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the added liquidity, as well as other advantages just mentioned, surely compensates for the additional 2% 
cost. In context, with prevailing Adeudos at 7-10%+, the ability to pay 2% for an additional year’s worth 
of liquidity is certainly a bargain. 
 
Space for Innovating 
 
The education contra-deposit product is just one example of the many types of interesting possibilities 
that comes with the overlap between Los Andes’ variable, low-interest accounts and its fixed, higher-
interest accounts. Furthermore, this overlap enables a more diverse set of products that address a broade  
range of social goals, while maintaining the same spr ads.  
 
Taken to another level, this could lead to an entirly new niche of microcredit loans. As a hypothetical 
example, if Los Andes were able to learn that a certain type of client was planning to make deposits in o
an Ahorro Normal account for 3 years to purchase a home, perhaps Los Andes could offer a 3.5-year 
maturity Plazo Fijo product to this customer with a promise to lend the customer a mortgage at the end of 
the period, as an incentive to lock up liquidity for a while longer.  
 
In this way, Los Andes would be able to extend the liquidity, generate an additional year’s worth of 
returns with those funds, and ultimately have a new target credit (the mortgage) with a client that has 
developed a relationship with Los Andes over the past four years and for whom the bank has much data.    
 
Matching Assets and Liabilities 
 
At the same time, it also helps show potential opportunities in more effectively matching assets and 
liabilities. As different liabilities behave differntly, they should be managed differently. More focused 
management of each product would allow Los Andes to be ter understand matching opportunities.  
 
From a financial perspective, matching certain types of assets and liabilities would allow for a reduction 
in a number of risks, including interest rate risk through immunization: as Plazo Fijo accounts represent 
fixed term obligations, it would certainly be feasible to use a collection of assets to immunize the int rest 
rate risks originating here.  
 
Los Andes should, however, proceed with caution in leveraging the overlaps between Ahorro Normal and 
Plazo Fijo and matching assets with liabilities. Correlation between all accounts should be more closely 
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examined, as high correlations may lead to firm-risk in the event of changes in underlying factors which 
have yet to be gleaned from a deeper analysis of client behavior. 
 
Measuring Liquidity Costs – Two Approaches 
 
As mentioned above, there are two potential methods of gauging the value that clients place on liquidity. 
First, if Los Andes is able to determine the ‘stickiness’ of Ahorro Normal clients, Los Andes may 
potentially encourage them to move into Plazo Fijo pr ducts of the same maturity. The differential 
between Ahorro Normal rates and the corresponding Plazo Fijo product’s rates may offer an indication of 
how clients’ willingness to exchange the liquidity of Ahorro Normal for higher interest rates.  
 
A second alternative would be to examine the relationship between the Dorada and Platinum accounts. As 
discussed above, clients seem to choose Dorada products over Platinum products. The differential 
between these two rates may gesture towards a cost of liquidity for clients already interested in Plazo Fijo 
products of a certain maturity. 
 
First Understand Clients 
 
Again, all of this comes with the prerequisite of truly understanding clients. Why certain accounts behav  
the way they do, the correlations between various accounts, the potential for joint products, etc. arell 
contingent upon client behavior. Clients differ betw en accounts (e.g. Ahorro Normal versus Plazo Fijo), 
maturity (here, the time to maturity for Plazo Fijo, or the ‘stickiness’ of Ahorro Normal), and a host f 
other metrics.  
 
It is important to understand clients in order for any of the above discussion to become a reality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
ADUEDOS 
 
Aduedos accounts are long-term credit lines that Los Andes can draw on at any time. While Los Andes 
can access short-term credit lines, usage is rare as the bank’s focus has been focusing on rapid buildup of 
financing sources that are long-term, stable, and relatively cheap, all else equal.  
 
After many structural changes under the watchful care of Ms. Ramos-Velita, ratings agencies updated Los 
Andes’ credit, allowing CLA to establish more credit line relationships. By securing increasingly longer-
term credit lines, Los Andes is able to achieve what we discussed above – longer-term credits, increased 
rollover, lower interest rates for client credits, etc. 
 
The financial cost of Aduedos has surged to more than S/. 21M today from S/. 1.9M a year ago. For 
context, this exceeds financial costs of Ahorro Normal, at S/. 10M, and is second to the financial costs f 
Plazo Fijo, at S/. 61M. Indeed, this illustrates Los Andes’ focus on extending obligations through stable, 
long-term Aduedos.  
 
A question for forecasting, however, was where the financial cost was coming from. Cost of Aduedos on 
the Income Statement was derived from an actual cash p yment cost, as well as a provisions cost. 
Previously, there had been no analysis on the relativ  scale of each source. And with an increasing 
number of credit lines, Los Andes had not done a bre kdown on which lines was costing the bank more in 
actual cash payments and provisions. Our analysis was centered on breaking down the Income Statement 
Aduedos cost line item and will be shown below.  
 
 
CTS 
 
CTS serves as an account for employee wages into which employers can directly deposit wages. While 
CLA’s CTS rate is one of the highest in the country, it represents both a small percentage of total pub ic 
obligations, as well as a relatively small financial ost, at S/. 3M.  
 
And, as the majority of CTS clients for Los Andes are its own employees, this account serves a secondary 
purpose of employee retention. Indeed, I have found firsthand that all members of the Los Andes team are 
highly driven and work long, hard hours. It is a significant gesture of goodwill and respect that Los Andes 
offers such a great savings program for its own employees.  
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BUILDING A CASH FORECASTING MODEL  
 
Given all of the above, it is evident that there ar substantial number of factors that determine the 
amount of cash that CLA needs and to which the bank has access. As such, it is important that we 
consider each type of account in turn. Specifically, this includes the credits on the asset side, and the 
Ahorro Normal, Plazo Fijo, and Aduedos accounts on the liabilities side. While we would have liked to 
have complete data for every single transaction that Los Andes has processed by amount, product, type,
location, etc., data for each account type is varied in form and not necessarily complete in one single data 
bank. This led to different methods of analysis for each account type. 
 
For these accounts, we considered the potential sources of inflow and outflow of cash and forecasted each 
account’s inflow and outflow separately. A list of these components is as followed: 
 
• Credits: Repayment; difference between actual and expected by Type. 
• Ahorro Normal: Inflow by Office 
• Ahorro Normal: Outflow by Office 
• Plazo Fijo: Growth of Dorada by Office 
• Plazo Fijo: Growth of Diamante by Office 
• Aduedos: Cost and Provision Breakdown by Credit Line. 
 
Importantly, we excluded a category for ‘Credits: Extension’, the cash outflow components of 
microcredits. Unfortunately, we did not feel confident with the data for which we had access to build a 
forecast regarding the amount of credit extension Ls Andes could expect. The data attained was 
primarily a bottoms-up forecast by analysts. These for casts, however, were not subsequently compared 
against actual credit extension. As such, we only had forecasts for future months (over several periods of 
surveying), with no way to validate how accurate thse bottoms-up, analyst-level forecasts were. We 
therefore carried on with our forecasts with the remaining inflow and outflow components of asset and 
liability accounts. 
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CREDITS: REPAYMENT ; ACTUAL VERSUS EXPECTED 
 
In order to get a handle on the expected amount of credit repayment by loan type, we wanted to compare 
the amount of repayment Los Andes should have receiv d, and the amount of repayment Los Andes 
actually received. For the primary loan types – Agricultural, Pymes, Convenio, and Otros – we found the 
differences and, subsequently, the average differenc  across all periods and the standard deviation of that 
average difference. 
 
In this way, we were able to get a general idea of how well Los Andes was collecting interest rate 
payments on loans. An example of these calculations using Agricultural loan data can be found in 
Appendix VIII.  
 
As a side-note, credit repayment exhibited trend-like behavior much like Ahorro Normal. We tried to 
analyze this behavior in a similar fashion, but again came up empty handed. Below is a graphical 
representation of collections across all offices in the second quarter of 2012. The blue lines represent 
agricultural loan collections, the red pymes, the green convenio, and the puple otros.  
 
Since we were unable to find trends here, we stuck with the findings that we found regarding loan 
collections, as can be found in Appendix VIII. 
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AHORRO NORMAL : INFLOW AND OUTFLOW BY OFFICE  
 
For the Ahorro Normal accounts, we wanted to forecast how much cash each office needed on hand at 
any point in time. In order to do this, we calculated he average monthly transaction size over a period of 
time. We calculated the monthly CAGR growth rate, as well as the standard deviation on the growth rate 
for each month. An example of the calculations we made for Ahorro Normal Inflow, using data from the 
Puno office, can be found in Appendix VIII. We completed the same calculations for Ahorro Normal 
Inflow and Outflow for offices in Puno, Macusani, Ayaviri, Juliaca, Ovalo Roman Castillo, Desaguadero, 
and Ayacucho. 
 
However, before calculating the above, we recognized that there were several shock events that would 
lead to projections unreflective of the reality of account size growth over time. As such, we sought to 
remove days within each month that represented a move ent of capital beyond a cumulative 85% 
probability of events. We thus removed these ‘shock’ events and recalculated the above. Our process for 
this can be found in the second page of Appendix VIII. This 85% cumulative level was arbitrary, but we
felt that it was effective. The chart below shows the amount of Ahorro Normal Outflow with shocks for 
each day (in red above), as well as the Ahorro Normal Outflow without shocks (in blue below), in the 
Puno office; we repeated this process for Ahorro Normal Inflow, and the aforementioned offices. 
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With these steps, we were able to calculate the monthly average CAGR growth (excluding shocks), the 
standard deviation of that growth (excluding shocks), the average number of shocks per month (and the 
corresponding standard deviation), and the size of sh cks (with the corresponding standard deviation). 
 
With these inputs, we used Crystal Ball’s Monte Carlo simulation in Excel to project total inflow of funds 
over the course of 1 month to 18 months. The inputs to he Monte Carlo simulation included information 
described in the immediately preceding paragraph, while the output described the total Ahorro Normal 
inflows. It is important to note that the amount simulated for each month is not compounded on top of 
previous month forecasts. Rather, the results of each month are independent of previous months. However, 
growth rates are compounded. 
 
We repeated this process for Ahorro Normal outflows by office as well. Finally, by finding the difference 
between Ahorro Normal inflows and outflows, we were able to find a net position for Ahorro Normal 
accounts by office over periods up to 18 months. The layout for these calculations can also be found in 
Appendix VIII.  
 
 
PLAZO FIJO FORECASTS 
 
In order to get an idea of potential Plazo Fijo amounts, we focused our efforts on the Dorada and 
Diamante products – the two largest and most active product types. For this, we simply calculated the 
monthly CAGR growth rate of each account by office, ncluding: 
 
• Dorada: 180 Days, 360 Days, 390 Days, 450 Days 
• Diamante: 720 Days, 1080 Days 
 
The above products were considered in the offices of Puno, Ayacucho, Ayaviri, Juliaca, Ovalo Ramon 
Castilla, Desaguadero, and Macusani. The layout for calculations can be found in Appendix VIII. 
 
Once we had the monthly CAGR growth rates, as well as the standard deviations for those growth rates, 
we simply took the current base amount and compounded the monthly CAGR growth. 
 
With this, we were able to estimate the total amount of Plazo Fijo funds by product type in each office 
and, in aggregate, the amount of Plazo Fijo funds for each product. 
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ADUEDOS FORECASTING  
 
For the Aduedos accounts, we simply compiled the contracts for each credit line and found the amount of 
cash that was due for each period. Afterwards, we found records for the amount of provisions Los Andes 
made for each credit line.  
 
By summing up the cash payment and the provision allotted, we were able to find a total effect of each 
credit line, given a certain amount of margin of error stemming from Los Andes’ data, as well as some 
interpretive issues between what we needed, and what could be provided.  
 
The total cost breakdown for type of credit line can be found in Appendix VIII. 
 
 
ACTIONS DEPEND ON RISKS 
 
Given the cash forecasts, the next step would be to de ermine how Los Andes should approach each 
account type. More focused management by account type would certainly be a great step forward towards 
all of the aforementioned benefits.  
 
However, it may be worth considering alternatives. For example, the following is a general template of 
approaches to risk, given different levels of impact and probabilities of those risks: 
 
• Impact High, Probability High: Avoid 
• Impact High, Probability Low: Transfer 
• Impact Low, Probability High: Control 
• Impact Low, Probability Low: Accept 
 
Furthermore, given that certain products far surpass others in terms of performance and importance to Los 
Andes, it may be worth reviewing the product mix currently offered. Are all products necessary? Should 
new products be created to fulfill certain demands? 
 
Answers to these and other questions will rely on superior analysis of past events, a sound understanding 
of the current state of affairs, as well as a reason ble expectation of what is to come in the future. And 
underlying all of this is, of course, a comprehensive understanding of the clients.  
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OTHER CONSIDERATIONS  
 
There are a number of important quantitative issues in our forecasts. For example, the appropriateness of 
CAGR growth should be assessed, as should the 85% threshold we used in extracting shocks from the 
Ahorro Normal data. Furthermore, assuming our forecasting methodology holds, it is equally important 
that simulations are run and, subsequently, appropriately interpreted. 
 
There are also a number of complications outside of the quantitative concerns. First, our forecasts do not 
account for SBS reserve ratio requirements, capital requirements, leverage requirements, and so forth. 
And, as has been a consistent theme throughout this paper, an understanding of underlying client behavior 
will help to inform our model and forecasts to a greater degree.  
 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE FORECASTING  
 
Given our experience with Los Andes’ data capabilities – conducting analysis and forming forecasts – we 
believe we have identified a number of opportunities for Los Andes to improve its internal information 
systems. 
 
Each Branch Its Own Bank 
 
We believe that different offices serve different types of clients and, therefore, should expect different 
types of client behavior to affect their respective operations. As such, each office in the Los Andes 
network should be operated with the same level of rig r and intensity as the Puno headquarters.  
 
Furthermore, each office could have a different financing and asset mix, reflective of different client 
bases. This suggests that each office may need to tweak their businesses in order to manage these 
idiosyncratic differences. And at a more fundamental level, different financing and asset mixes will lead 
to differing levels of cash needs. 
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Digitize and Document Everything 
 
The best way to capture each data point for all products, observe trends between products, understand 
clients, etc., would be to record a detailed life o each Los Andes client. What products does each client 
hold? When did they get this product? How many times have clients rolled-over funds? Did we get more 
or less funds that we expected? Why? By building up profiles for each client, Los Andes would be able to 
significantly pursue the various opportunities described above.  
 
Furthermore, since data is incomplete or inconsistent across different databanks, building one central 
record of client portfolios and transactions would offer the raw materials for any type of analysis Los 
Andes pursues in the future. 
 
And as a side-note regarding Plazo Fijo, projecting cash needs related to Plazo Fijo would be simple as 
each client’s Plazo Fijo account is simply a fixed-t rm deposit with a pre-specified maturity date. This 
would allow Los Andes to break down the enormous Plazo Fijo and estimate the amount of cash needed 
at each maturity, down to the day. 
 
New Data Coming In Every Branch 
 
According to Jimmy, each branch of Los Andes is now reporting daily inflow and outflow cash flows 
from credits. This real-time data could allow Los Andes to better manage cash by providing timely 
indicators of liquidity needs and even warn of shocks that may be systematic and affect other offices. 
Furthermore, this would allow Los Andes to get an even more detailed look into how efficient Los Andes 
is in collecting interest payments, lending credit, etc. at a micro level. 
 
If this system proves effective, it may be worth considering implementing the same infrastructure for 
liabilities to track Ahorro Normal and Plazo Fijo in real-time.  
 
Map of Analyst Routes and Loans 
 
It might be interesting to build a map of credit analysts’ collection and disbursement routes. It may be 
possible that one Los Andes client may pique the interest of their neighbors, leading to spillover effects in 
communities – neighbors borrow from Los Andes, garnering the interest of their neighbors who borrow 
from Los Andes, and so forth.  
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This would give Los Andes an idea of how different routes affect collection and disbursement, spillover 
effect in communities, as well as the level of penetration in certain areas. In areas where there is much 
penetration, perhaps sending one analyst to a local community center would be enough to operate 
efficiently. Conversely, in areas where there is little penetration, perhaps sending multiple analysts to 
engage in door-to-door sales and collection operations would be more effective. This is just one of the
many ways a strong understanding of analyst routes and client locales could prove to be beneficial. 
 
Growth Assumptions, Understanding Clients 
 
Throughout our research, we avoided the issue of determining drivers of growth. It remains unclear what 
drives the growth of various accounts. Drivers certainly include macro factors – interest rates, inflation, 
various types of government intervention, seasonality, etc. – as well as micro factors – number of buses 
commuting between rural regions and Los Andes offices, the days which clients get paid and potentially 
utilize their Ahorro Normal accounts, etc. 
 
Ultimately, pinpointing the most important macro and micro factors that affect Los Andes’ accounts 
would help the bank understand and forecast growth, the variance of this growth, and how growth and 
size in turn affects variance. Without a fundamental gr sping of these drivers, it becomes difficult to 
model persistent underlying trends and, in some cass more importantly, forecast shocks that might occur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
CASH MANAGEMENT FOR THE NEXT BILLION  
 
Cash is the lifeblood of firms that deal primarily in capital, such as MFIs. Offices need to have ample 
supply of cash to not only meet withdrawal and credit xtension needs, but also withstand various types 
of liquidity shocks. Effective cash management can help address these countervailing issues, lower costs, 
better manage reserves, reduce various forms of risk, and support efforts in asset liability matching. 
 
Approaching internal MFI decisions from both a social perspective, as well as a financial perspective 
(both, ultimately addressing a client need), would allow us to make better decisions on interest rates, 
product offerings, and whether to lower interest rates, extend maturities, increase loan sizes, etc.  
 
Internal treasury management can facilitate the achievement of social goals. And these commonsense 
analyses and reasonable forecasts can drastically increase MFI capabilities around the globe. MFIs should 
promote and invest in financial cash management techniques and measures to support rapid, sustainable 
growth, but also to better address the needs of clients and reach ‘the next billion’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additional Components of Securitization1 
 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
 
Assets are bundled together with the help of Issuers who create Special Purpose Vehicles. These vehicles 
help to consolidate assets, ‘structure’ the bond-like security, sell the finalized security to investor , and 
funnel payments from debtors to the investors.  
 
To qualify as an SPV however, the entity must fulfill three requirements:  
 
1. Asset Component: Asset Pooling 
Credit-sensitive assets must be pooled together, either in a cash-based transaction, or a synthetic 
transaction, as when dealing with synthetic assets uch as credit-default swaps. Pooling is a key 
component of SPV creation as this leads to a diversified collection of assets, thereby enabling the 
SPV to create tranches to satisfy various levels of investor risk appetite.  
 
2. Transfer Component: De-Link Credit Risk (True Sale and Derecognition) 
SPVs must be bankruptcy remote – investors cannot chase after the assets of the Originator, and 
vice-versa. In essence, SPVs must own the collection of assets as if they were its own from a true 
sale: the SPV may pledge, sell, and exchange the assets; the Originator must entirely surrender 
and transfer control from an accounting perspective and derecognize the assets from its balance 
sheet. All of this, and other behavior of the SPV, are legally limited and pre-determined.  
 
3. Liability Component: Transfer Tranching 
The market value of the asset must be equivalent to the market value of the tranched assets. 
Furthermore, the value and risk of the underlying assets must be preserved in the tranched assets.  
 
Tranching in SPVs 
 
Tranching, essentially a process to divide up assets by their credit quality, is a powerful component of 
securitization. It allows investors to match their risk appetite with a particular tranch, which correspond 
with a certain level of risk and reward. Furthermore, t anching allows for increased credit enhancement, 
as will be discussed below.  
 
In terms of the organization of assets, SPVs may be ‘pass through’ entities in which interest and principal 
payments from the assets are simply passed on to investors. Alternatively, SPVs may hold ‘structured 
securities’ that organize payments in the form of ‘waterfall payments’ in which Senior investors are paid 
small returns first (for little risk), and subsequently Mezzanine, Junior, and Equity investors for an 
accompanying increase in risk and reward.  
 
Credit Rating Enhancements 
 
As with most debt securities, asset-backed securities are given a credit rating to signal to investors he 
amount of credit risk involved in owning the security. Credit risk is defined as the debtor’s ability to make 
payments of the promised size on the promised date and is typically assessed by a credit ratings agency 
like S&P, Moody’s and Fitch.  
 
                                                   
1  bionicturtledotcom. "bionicturtle.com - expert fina ce and risk." YouTube. N.p., n.d. Web. 1 Aug. 2012. 
<http://www.youtube.com/user/bionicturtledotcom 
 
In the case of the SPV and its tranches, there are ‘internal’ and ‘external’ methods of boosting the 
securitization’s credit rating. These methods of credit enhancement are an integral component of a 
securitization as they help to create a security that has a higher rating than the issuing company (e.g.
originator that created the mortgage); ratings are determined by cash flows, not by the quality of the
underlying firm. With this higher rating, the Originator is able to monetize its assets while paying a lower 
rate of interest than would be possible then had the issuing company acquired a bank loan or other form 
of debt issuance independently. Investors, many of whom are required to invest in a certain quality of 
assets, are also able to invest in a new asset class th t meets their requirements. And, ideally, firms can 
pass on cost savings from this cheaper cost of capital to consumers (e.g. in the form of lower rates) or 
back to shareholders and other investors.  
 
External Credit Enhancements 
 
External credit enhancements include third-party protections for investors such as various types of 
insurance, guarantees, letters of credit, wraps, etc. Other tools include put options on the underlying assets, 
or basket credit default swap schemes to protect investors from default. 
 
Internal Credit Enhancements 
 
The structure of the securitization determines the extent of internal credit enhancement. Perhaps the 
clearest example of an internal credit enhancement would be the tranching (or, subordination), in which 
different types of investors are paid earlier or later, and more or less, than others. The order and amount of 
payment creates an implicit ‘shield’ that raises the quality of the top-tier tranche in the ratings process. 
Excess spread, in which inflows of cash payments exce d cash outflows to investors, also enhances the 
securitization’s credit rating. Other techniques, such as direct equity issuances, holdbacks, cash collateral 
accounts, among others, are internal structures that help raise the securitization’s rating.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX I: BENEFITS OF MICROFINANCE 
 
Repayment Rate 
Historically, 98% of microfinance loanees have repaid loan principals in full, with interest. 
Various factors contribute to this high rate of repayment, which will be outlined below (Pg. 9) 
 
Little to No Collateral 
Typically, loanees in developing region are rejected by commercial banks for not having credit 
scores or meaningful collateral. This marginalizes the impoverished by restricting opportunity for 
self-investment and capital-investment. Microfinance is based on the belief that many of these 
individuals ‘need a dollar, to catch a dollar’ and does not require a credit score or collateral. 
 
Makes Loans More Accessible 
Commercial banks oftentimes cannot physically handle microfinance loans (disbursement, 
repayment, etc.) and the associated costs. MFIs make small loans in large quantities to achieve 
scale, while commercial banks extend fewer loans of larger size. Because of higher transaction 
costs per loan, and more transaction costs by volume alone (volume that is necessary to scale 
initiatives), commercial banks avoid microfinance. MFIs accept higher costs by charging higher 
interest - Phoenix plans to change this component - a d accepting lower margins. 
 
Business Skill and Opportunities  
Loanees are offered an opportunity to start small businesses and develop local infrastructure that 
can vastly raise living standards. In the process, loanees attain basic financial literacy and and 
business skills that can be applied universally. Furthermore, these small businesses spill-over into 
surrounding communities in the form of employment and more quality goods and services.  
 
Equal Opportunity for Women 
Microfinance loans are extended primarily to women. Studies have shown that women in 
developing countries manage household finances moreeffectively than men and spend money on 
their own families and communities; the preference towards women loanees was first tested and 
proved through Grameen in Bangladesh. Microfinance has given women higher social positions 
in the household and shifted cultural norms towards more respect and enfranchisement for 
women. 
 
Self-Sufficiency, Independence, Sustainability  
Unlike aid which gives a man a fish, microfinance funds the fishing pole. Microfinance promotes 
long-term, sustainable practices, not short-term aid donations. We recognize and support 
emergency aid and believe that microfinance provides a path towards self-sufficient populations 
that are financially and otherwise independent. 
 
Closely Integrated Into Local Cultures 
Microfinance does not seek to change local cultures, or promote foreign forms of culture. Rather, 
microfinance financially supports projects that locals themselves deem necessary. As such, there 
is no issue of paternalism from ‘the West’ or ‘cultural degradation.’ 
 
Spillover Effects 
Microfinance oftentimes takes skills and technology from the developed world and redistributes 
them to the developing world. As these skills and technology are more readily utilized and 
available, surrounding communities as a whole may experience gains in efficiency and higher 
standards of living. These spill-over effects are crucial elements on the path towards development. 
 
APPENDIX I: SHORTCOMINGS OF MICROFINANCE  
 
Asset Loss 
Regions in which MFIs operate are associated with a high risk of  loss of assets due to external 
factors beyond the institutions control. These include natural disasters, fires, robberies, thefts, 
riots among other risks. MFIs may potentially lose entire portfolios overnight due to a 
unpredictable occurrences.  
 
Principal-Agent 
Aid agencies and aid recipients have ceaselessly grappled with the Principal-Agent Dilemma. 
While Principals (aid agencies, foundations, granters) have certain priorities and requirements for 
aid, Agents oftentimes hold drastically different priorities, implementation methods, etc. 
Microfinance also faces this risk as MFIs seek repayment to maintain sustainability while loanees 
face the challenges of developing their businesses, rai ing and feeding their families, and 
addressing a myriad of other critical issues. 
 
Commoditization of Poverty  
Upon reaching scale, a few MFIs have begun to view clients as sources of revenue, rather than 
impoverished people seeking opportunity. This severly damages the reputation and effectiveness 
of microfinance as a whole, and has led to disastrou  consequences such as client drop-outs, and 
even suicide. It is up to MFIs to maintain their integrity and stay true to social missions, not profit 
end-games. 
 
Lack of Universal Process 
As the microfinance industry is still young, clear and proven processes are few and far between. 
How organizations should disburse capital, receive repayments, handle day-to-day accounting 
and record-keeping, audit internal practices, etc. are not unified throughout the industry and may 
sometimes lead to confusion both in between and within organizations, and between 
organizations and clients. 
 
Unclear Metrics 
Across the industry, metrics used to measure ‘success’ are unclear and unestablished. Whether 
percent repayment, gross margin, number of clients, average size of loans, some form of ROI, etc. 
should be used when evaluating success is still undetermined. Different environments, 
considerations, organizations, loanees, etc. call for different sets of metrics, leading to much 
difficulty in determining a universal set of performance metrics. Furthermore, a drive to achieve a 
certain performance level in terms of numerical metrics may lead organizations to lose sight of 
real, on-the-ground conditions. Institutions are often left creating their own standards of success 
for different contexts. 
 
High Costs, High Interest Rates 
There are three costs that interest rates must cover through microloans: the cost of the money that 
it lends, the cost of loan defaults, and transaction c sts. The first two are proportional to the 
amount lent. For example, if MFIs incurred costs of 10% to raise capital and experiences defaults 
of 1%, then the two costs bump interests to 11% immediately. The third type of cost, transaction 
cost, is not proportional to the amount lent. Transaction costs on a $500 are not much different 
from the transaction costs incurred on a $100 loan (equivalent staff, paperwork, etc.). Transaction 
costs, thus, is the primary of high, or low, interest rates. 
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APPENDIX III: RECENT MICROFINANCE SECURITIZATIONS 
 
APPENDIX IV: CHARACTERISTICS OF LOANS 
 
TYPES OF LOANS 
 
  
 
LOAN SIZE 
 
 
 
 
TIME TO MATURITY OF LOANS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX V: REPAYMENT FACTORS 
 
Borrowers: 
• Age 
• Amount of Disposable Income 
• Degree of Self-Selection 
• Experience 
• Formality of Business 
• Gender 
• Homogeneity of Group 
• Income 
• Landed Relatives (family wealth proxy) 
• Level of Education/Financial Literacy 
• Number of Years as Client 
• Other Jobs 
• Past History (Previous Late Payment?) 
• “Product (Customer) Life Cycle” (e.g. 
later years, customers have less non-
business income which may make it 
harder to repay the loan.) 
• Productive Assets and Monetary Value 
 
Living Situation: 
• % of Years Living In One Place 
• Family Size 
• Marital Status 
• Number of Months Living Elsewhere 
• Whether Spouse Lives Elsewhere 
 
Access and Transparency: 
• Adequate Business Information 
• Increases in Financial Opportunities 
• Market Maturity/ Regulatory Clearness  
• Number of Alternative Credit Sources  
o (e.g. gov., commercial banks, 
cooperatives, NGOs, relatives, 
friends/neighbors, shopkeepers, 
landlords, etc.) 
• Rurality 
 
 
 
 
 
Monitoring: 
• Credit Bureaus  
• Distance to Nearest Office 
• Frequency of Visits 
• Number of Visits 
 
Pressures: 
• Amount of Peer Pressure from Group 
• Collateral and/or Personal Guarantees 
• Erosion of Credit by Credit Bureaus 
• General Enforcement to Repay 
• Penalty for Lateness  
• Promise of Larger Credit 
 
Support: 
• Credit Officer Experience  
• Membership in cooperatives Societies 
• # of Community Self-Help Groups  
• Outreach  
• Relationship with Banker 
• Socio-Cultural Activities Spending (e.g. 
as a form of networking.) 
 
Project: 
• Ownership Structure of Projects 
• Seasonality  
• Types of Projects 
 
Loan: 
• Collateral Backing Type (e.g. none, 
signed/personal guarantee, credit group.) 
• Collateral Used 
• Diversification of Loan Usage 
• Flexibility of Repayment Schedule 
• Initial Fees (including the amount of 
fees, % of loan size) 
• Interest Rate of Loan 
• Monetary Value of Collateral 
• Payment Frequency in Loan Contract 
• Proportion of Repayment on Date Due  
• Size of Loan 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX VI: PLAZO FIJO PRODUCT LIST 
 
Interest rates shown are an average monthly rate between May 2011 and May 2012. 
Tarjeta Platinum 
Tarjeta Platinum 90 Días 0.3577% 
Tarjeta Platinum 180 Días 0.5980% 
Tarjeta Platinum 360 Días 0.8040% 
Tarjeta Platinum 390 Días 0.7302% 
Tarjeta Platinum 450 Días 0.8179% 
Tarjeta Dorada 
Tarjeta Dorada 60 Días 0.3367% 
Tarjeta Dorada 90 Días 0.3947% 
Tarjeta Dorada 120 Días 0.5062% 
Tarjeta Dorada 180 Días 0.5830% 
Tarjeta Dorada 360 Días 0.7431% 
Tarjeta Dorada 390 Días 0.7892% 
Tarjeta Dorada 450 Días 0.8178% 
Tarjeta Diamante 
Tarjeta Diamante 720 Días 0.9141% 
Tarjeta Diamante 1080 Días 1.0627% 
Tarjeta Diamante 1440 Días 0.9741% 
Tarjeta Diamante 1800 Días 1.0043% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX VII: PLAZO FIJO BREAKDOWN BY PRODUCT 
 
PLATINUM 
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APPENDIX VIII: CALCULATIONS FOR FORECASTING 
 
Following, calculations for… 
 
• Repayment: Agricultural Loans 
 
• Ahorro Normal Growth (Inflow) (Puno Office) 
 
• Ahorro Normal Shocks (Inflow) (Puno Office) 
 
• Ahorro Normal Cash Inflow and Outflow Simulation 
 
• Plazo Fijo, example from Dorada 180 Day Product 
 
• Plazo Fijo Dorada 180 Day Product Natural Growth Simulation 
 
• Aduedos Breakdown for Provisions and Cash Payments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actual Should Difference Average Difference Stan.Dev.
6/1/2011 312065.95 21284.91 290781.04 158926.4697 106178.2652 11273823994 64432.27817 472465.8824
6/2/2011 189831.93 9320.94 180510.99
6/3/2011 240305.28 9894.91 230410.37
6/4/2011 132485.66 10527.47 121958.19
6/5/2011 1337.67 22541.36 -21203.69
6/6/2011 258672.94 10721.66 247951.28
6/7/2011 232845.99 10368.37 222477.62
6/8/2011 196761.74 22687.78 174073.96
6/9/2011 124373.52 10730.52 113643
6/10/2011 191527.27 8454.23 183073.04
6/11/2011 95398.23 16711.89 78686.34
6/12/2011 3617.68 28488.2 -24870.52
6/13/2011 319779.91 9542.97 310236.94
6/14/2011 120498.01 7394.85 113103.16
6/15/2011 175184.73 9225.02 165959.71
6/16/2011 147674.24 9211.95 138462.29
6/17/2011 202337.45 12141.93 190195.52
6/18/2011 137233.97 10279.7 126954.27
6/19/2011 2221.26 8551.45 -6330.19
6/20/2011 349719.97 8250.85 341469.12
6/21/2011 191684.5 5690.68 185993.82
6/22/2011 136263.79 5856.72 130407.07
6/23/2011 147004.31 6309.54 140694.77
6/24/2011 82523.07 9799.21 72723.86
6/25/2011 57128.97 15189.1 41939.87
6/26/2011 3205.04 7649.31 -4444.27
6/27/2011 422869.01 12535.73 410333.28
6/28/2011 209933.26 22709.72 187223.54
6/29/2011 135223.67 19554.31 115669.36
6/30/2011 317739.11 8028.76 309710.35
Ave. Growth Ave.
2,429.77 CAGR Mon. -0.06% 2,429.77 933.54 956.01 724.02 978.02 1,439.36 2,112.65 1,708.21 1,188.96 876.75 1,365.66 1,152.17 926.06 2,410.88
5/1/2011 0.00 Stan.Dev. 46.61% -61.58% 2.41% -24.27% 35.08% 47.17% 46.78% -19.14% -30.40% -26.26% 55.76% -15.63% -19.62% 160.34% -0.78% -0.06%
5/2/2011 4,777.84
5/3/2011 2,033.31 61.52% -2.47% 24.21% -35.14% -47.23% -46.84% 19.08% 30.34% 26.20% -55.82% 15.57% 19.56% -160.40%
(C-R) ^ 2 / N Ave. (C-R) (Ave. (C-R)) ^ 2 Difference Stan. Dev
5/5/2011 2,038.40 37.85% 0.06% 5.86% 12.35% 22.31% 21.94% 3.64% 9.20% 6.86% 31.16% 2.43% 3.83% 257.28% 414.76% 13 31.90% 31.90% 10.18% 21.73% 46.61%
5/6/2011 1,052.75
5/8/2011 0.00
5/9/2011 2,188.00
5/10/2011 3,015.72
5/11/2011 7,379.11
5/12/2011 38.80
5/13/2011 7,976.93
5/14/2011 549.23
5/15/2011 0.00
5/16/2011 3,848.40
5/19/2011 2,695.60
5/20/2011 10,197.57
5/21/2011 2,408.68
5/22/2011 0.00
5/23/2011 3,954.99
5/24/2011 1,405.00
5/26/2011 1,643.30
5/27/2011 1,346.80
5/28/2011 38.40
5/29/2011 0.00
5/30/2011 4,319.20
5/31/2011 266.00
933.54
6/3/2011 3,673.22
6/4/2011 244.60
6/5/2011 0.00
6/6/2011 747.66
6/7/2011 1,740.57
6/8/2011 6,134.76
6/9/2011 150.00
6/10/2011 626.40
6/11/2011 10.32
6/12/2011 0.00
6/13/2011 1,407.45
6/14/2011 136.30
6/15/2011 9.60
6/16/2011 0.00
6/17/2011 0.00
6/18/2011 0.00
6/19/2011 0.00
6/20/2011 0.00
6/21/2011 0.00
6/22/2011 0.00
6/23/2011 0.00
6/24/2011 129.60
6/25/2011 9.60
6/26/2011 0.00
6/27/2011 1,091.40
6/28/2011 1,089.60
6/29/2011 3,752.40
6/30/2011 5,185.55
Average Stan.Dev Shock Threshold Average Stan.Dev Shock Threshold Number of Shocks
24,157.62 16,124.61 40,869.70 33161.03 29477.52 63712.51 4 91683 26887 722935316.40 3 1.664100589
1-Jun-11 19,314.58 0
2-Jun-11 35,415.52 0 Characteristics of Shocks
3-Jun-11 19,159.70 0 394482.5767 296318.3372
4-Jun-11 16,779.30 0
1 5-Jun-11 70,313.73
6-Jun-11 28,354.37 0
7-Jun-11 33,201.22 0
8-Jun-11 34,263.03 0
9-Jun-11 18,217.75 0
10-Jun-11 7,883.65 0
11-Jun-11 8,095.97 0
12-Jun-11 20.00 0
13-Jun-11 32,643.28 0
14-Jun-11 53,977.42 1
1 15-Jun-11 137,367.50
16-Jun-11 33,873.05 0
17-Jun-11 35,586.91 0
1 18-Jun-11 74,405.91
19-Jun-11 0.03 0
20-Jun-11 46,362.46 1
21-Jun-11 24,603.88 0
22-Jun-11 17,095.00 0
23-Jun-11 12,878.99 0
24-Jun-11 15,777.24 0
25-Jun-11 6,235.52 0
26-Jun-11 0.00 0
27-Jun-11 30,137.13 0
28-Jun-11 59,879.58 1
29-Jun-11 38,342.43 0
1 30-Jun-11 84,645.67
31,100.55 27,169.20 59,259.61 46708.96 53118.30 101762.53 4 152066 60159 3619076596.66
1-Jul-11 46,503.45 0
2-Jul-11 30,864.62 0
3-Jul-11 0.00 0
4-Jul-11 66,159.56 1
5-Jul-11 27,664.33 0
6-Jul-11 12,222.30 0
7-Jul-11 24,892.92 0
1 8-Jul-11 104,172.84
9-Jul-11 6,915.25 0
10-Jul-11 10.31 0
11-Jul-11 75,521.02 1
12-Jul-11 60,346.52 1
1 13-Jul-11 253,412.55
14-Jul-11 14,701.05 0
15-Jul-11 73,824.56 1
16-Jul-11 43,122.30 0
17-Jul-11 523.22 0
18-Jul-11 24,495.54 0
19-Jul-11 25,165.61 0
20-Jul-11 43,496.84 0
21-Jul-11 20,554.12 0
22-Jul-11 66,574.04 1
23-Jul-11 72,475.59 1
24-Jul-11 0.00 0
25-Jul-11 31,317.45 0
1 26-Jul-11 140,874.81
1 27-Jul-11 109,802.71
28-Jul-11 10.00 0
29-Jul-11 70.70 0
30-Jul-11 71,754.01 1
31-Jul-11 529.40 0
CITY
CASH INFLOW
CASH OUTFLOW
NET CASH
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Puno
2804323.964 2907856.423 3018001.955 3135182.963 3259848.836 3392477.663 3533578.074 3683691.186 3843392.68 4013295.007 4194049.739 4386350.067 4590933.459 4808584.488 5040137.84 5286481.519 5548560.247 5827379.09
2169506.006 2175507.435 2181539.326 2187601.835 2193695.117 2199819.327 2205974.624 2212161.165 2218379.108 2224628.613 2230909.84 2237222.95 2243568.105 2249945.467 2256355.2 2262797.469 2269272.438 2275780.274
634817.9574 732348.9887 836462.6286 947581.1283 1066153.719 1192658.336 1327603.45 1471530.021 1625013.572 1788666.394 1963139.899 2149127.118 2347365.355 2558639.021 2783782.64 3023684.05 3279287.809 3551598.816
Macusani
12849.61665 13498.66451 14210.53828 14991.31932 15847.67766 16786.92895 17817.09699 18946.98224 20186.23704 21545.44804 23036.22664 24671.3082 26464.66081 28431.60465 30588.94283 32955.10496 35550.30459 38396.71186
14306.59792 15806.95108 17570.1696 19642.30811 22077.49009 24939.32162 28302.55268 32255.02964 36899.98974 42358.75764 48773.91437 56313.02146 65172.99762 75585.26219 87821.77971 102202.1635 119102.024 138962.7793
-1456.98127 -2308.28657 -3359.63133 -4650.98879 -6229.81244 -8152.39267 -10485.4557 -13308.0474 -16713.7527 -20813.3096 -25737.6877 -31641.7133 -38708.3368 -47153.6575 -57232.8369 -69247.0586 -83551.7194 -100566.067
Juliaca
483793.6891 478831.5047 473945.726 469135.1764 464398.6978 459735.1495 455143.4086 450622.3695 446170.9434 441788.0586 437472.6596 433223.7074 429040.1788 424921.0665 420865.3785 416872.1384 412940.3846 409069.1702
310150.8777 319315.2404 328884.0631 338875.1962 349307.2779 360199.7691 371572.9894 383448.1554 395847.4199 408793.9135 422311.7875 436426.2594 451163.6594 466551.4796 482618.4259 499394.4707 516910.9094 535200.4186
173642.8114 159516.2643 145061.6628 130259.9802 115091.4199 99535.38043 83570.41922 67174.21409 50323.52354 32994.14513 15160.87208 -3202.55202 -22123.4805 -41630.4132 -61753.0474 -82522.3323 -103970.525 -126131.248
Ayaviri
139511.9179 139468.5356 139425.1793 139381.849 139338.5448 139295.2666 139252.0143 139208.788 139165.5876 139122.4131 139079.2646 139036.142 138993.0452 138949.9743 138906.9293 138863.9101 138820.9167 138777.9491
150241.6754 151798.328 153386.2902 155006.1918 156658.6751 158344.3954 160064.0213 161818.2347 163607.7314 165433.2208 167295.4271 169195.0887 171132.959 173109.8064 175126.415 177183.5844 179282.1304 181422.8854
-10729.7575 -12329.7925 -13961.111 -15624.3427 -17320.1303 -19049.1288 -20812.007 -22609.4468 -24442.1438 -26310.8077 -28216.1625 -30158.9468 -32139.9138 -34159.8321 -36219.4857 -38319.6743 -40461.2137 -42644.9363
Ovalo
284424.336 302506.7768 322532.7775 344711.2382 369273.5123 396475.82 426601.9206 459966.073 496916.3136 537838.0869 583158.2662 633349.6065 688935.6761 750496.3182 818673.6995 894179.0085 977799.875 1070408.586
264005.1451 269522.7734 275229.3701 281131.4069 287235.5773 293548.8039 300078.2467 306831.3105 313815.654 321039.1981 328510.1348 336236.9371 344228.3676 352493.4896 361041.6764 369882.6224 379026.3541 388483.2413
20419.19087 32984.00337 47303.40738 63579.83127 82037.93503 102927.016 126523.6739 153134.7625 183100.6596 216798.8889 254648.1313 297112.6694 344707.3085 398002.8286 457632.0231 524296.3861 598773.5209 681925.3444
Desaguadero
51565.96508 51694.79148 51826.27815 51960.48003 52097.45318 52237.25483 52379.9434 52525.57849 52674.22095 52825.93288 52980.77768 53138.82002 53300.12595 53464.76285 53632.7995 53804.30613 53979.35437 54158.01737
23772.85221 23901.61801 24032.16981 24164.53237 24298.73081 24434.79059 24572.73754 24712.59782 24854.39798 24998.16492 25143.92592 25291.70864 25441.54111 25593.45178 25747.46946 25903.62338 26061.94316 26222.45886
27793.11287 27793.17347 27794.10834 27795.94766 27798.72237 27802.46424 27807.20586 27812.98066 27819.82297 27827.76796 27836.85176 27847.11138 27858.58483 27871.31107 27885.33005 27900.68275 27917.41121 27935.55851
Ayacucho
649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383 649136.2383
587283.7691 605136.4993 623908.237 643646.29 664400.4015 686222.8752 709168.7074 733295.7253 758664.7331 785339.6648 813387.7456 842879.6613 873889.7364 906496.1215 940780.9899 976830.7452 1014736.239 1054592.998
61852.46917 43999.73896 25228.00129 5489.9483 -15264.1632 -37086.6369 -60032.4691 -84159.487 -109528.495 -136203.426 -164251.507 -193743.423 -224753.498 -257359.883 -291644.752 -327694.507 -365600 -405456.76
Total
4425605.727 4542992.935 4669078.692 4804499.265 4949940.96 5106144.321 5273908.696 5454097.216 5647642.221 5855551.185 6078913.172 6318905.89 6576803.384 6853984.453 7151941.828 7472292.226 7816787.321 8187325.763
3519266.924 3560988.845 3604549.626 3650067.76 3697673.269 3747509.283 3799733.879 3854522.218 3912069.034 3972591.532 4036332.775 4103565.626 4174597.366 4249775.078 4329491.957 4414194.679 4504392.038 4600665.056
906338.8029 982004.0897 1064529.066 1154431.504 1252267.69 1358635.038 1474174.817 1599574.997 1735573.187 1882959.652 2042580.397 2215340.263 2402206.019 2604209.375 2822449.872 3058097.547 3312395.282 3586660.707
Cash Inflow Assumptions
Base Amount (Jun'12) Normal Growth Number of Shocks Characteristics of Shocks
Puno 50,785.33 CAGR Mon. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev.
0.06 31.62% 3 1.664100589 394482.5767 296318.3372
Macusani 203.78 CAGR Mon. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev.
9.68% #NUM! 4.923076923 2.92105193 1248.075519 6427.626782
Juliaca 10,910.33 CAGR Mon. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev.
-1.54% 30.09% 3.571428571 1.449841652 45226.57336 61512.06061
Ayaviri 2,410.88 CAGR Mon. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev.
-0.06% 46.61% 3.142857143 1.561909229 21,391.01 27329.18295
Ovalo 5,063.58 CAGR Mon. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev.
10.75% #NUM! 3.076923077 1.439098995 37761.55544 83613.18377
Desaguadero 203.74 CAGR Mon. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev.
2.07% #NUM! 2.307692308 1.726918794 19641.87844 3265.818601
Ayacucho 5,354.53 CAGR Mon. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev.
6.19% #NUM! 2.571428571 1.34771159 189972.2981 33783.43623
Cash Outflow Assumptions
Base Amount (Jun'12) Normal Growth Number of Shocks Characteristics of Shocks
Puno 39,212.01 CAGR Mon. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev.
0.51% 31.79% 2.153846154 0.863459397 458331.0157 475357.264
Macusani 242.90 CAGR Mon. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev.
17.52% #NUM! 3.076923077 1.327898192 1866.491859 1948.121435
Juliaca 6,629.05 CAGR Mon. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev.
4.41% 33.15% 3.928571429 1.279748062 26091.48715 39607.01062
Ayaviri 2,528.93 CAGR Mon. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev.
2.01% 47.47% 3.285714286 1.097306535 22171.09169 30629.75902
Ovalo 5,192.42 CAGR Mon. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev.
3.42% 39.50% 3.923076923 1.542302897 26228.80341 23887.04539
Desaguadero 305.22 CAGR Mon. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev.
1.39% 37.29% 2.846153846 1.349994521 5090.781718 6234.531606
Ayacucho 10,994.34 CAGR Mon. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev. Ave. Stan.Dev.
5.15% 46.73% 4.818181818 1.028518954 49909.87547 46898.0668
CAGR CAGR Mon. Ave. Growth Stan.Dev.
Dorada 180 Days (inc. June)
Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12 May-12 Jun-12
Puno 7,270,038.52 7,245,173.94 6,979,181.64 6,631,690.07 6,610,956.05 6,557,429.54 6,595,322.88 6,783,077.17 6,947,802.48 7,246,910.77 7,478,152.68 7,833,717.40 7,712,798.08 6.09% 0.49% 0.54% 2.94%
-0.34% -3.67% -4.98% -0.31% -0.81% 0.58% 2.85% 2.43% 4.31% 3.19% 4.75% -1.54%
0.84% 4.17% 5.47% 0.81% 1.30% -0.08% -2.35% -1.93% -3.81% -2.70% -4.26% 2.04%
Ayacucho 523,029.41 530,470.41 643,984.40 652,988.05 1,663,899.28 1,058,563.00 1,063,756.81 1,071,317.28 1,048,050.30 1,060,653.84 32,981.37 37,889.36 44,569.52 -91.48% -18.55% 6.54% 54.13%
1.42% 21.40% 1.40% 154.81% -36.38% 0.49% 0.71% -2.17% 1.20% -96.89% 14.88% 17.63%
-19.98% -39.95% -19.95% -173.37% 17.83% -19.04% -19.26% -16.38% -19.76% 78.34% -33.43% -36.18%
Ayaviri 356,731.39 373,186.55 416,961.17 423,991.02 365,618.74 364,590.59 428,859.75 461,391.03 479,973.49 462,694.98 510,858.83 534,379.93 564,422.38 58.22% 3.90% 4.19% 7.63%
4.61% 11.73% 1.69% -13.77% -0.28% 17.63% 7.59% 4.03% -3.60% 10.41% 4.60% 5.62%
-0.72% -7.83% 2.21% 17.66% 4.18% -13.73% -3.69% -0.13% 7.50% -6.51% -0.71% -1.72%
Juliaca 624,481.86 569,169.23 506,338.78 561,787.98 594,163.61 618,412.62 617,751.61 590,336.03 692,780.31 735,338.21 746,504.95 730,593.28 873,486.62 39.87% 2.84% 3.23% 9.10%
-8.86% -11.04% 10.95% 5.76% 4.08% -0.11% -4.44% 17.35% 6.14% 1.52% -2.13% 19.56%
11.69% 13.87% -8.12% -2.93% -1.25% 2.94% 7.27% -14.52% -3.31% 1.32% 4.97% -16.72%
ORC 115,637.14 173,706.59 205,414.75 248,194.80 265,214.15 247,104.69 259,958.92 319,131.17 340,021.48 322,913.83 312,910.18 365,387.49 351,577.64 204.04% 9.71% 10.72% 15.60%
50.22% 18.25% 20.83% 6.86% -6.83% 5.20% 22.76% 6.55% -5.03% -3.10% 16.77% -3.78%
-40.51% -8.54% -11.12% 2.85% 16.54% 4.51% -13.05% 3.16% 14.74% 12.81% -7.06% 13.49%
Desagua. 17,014.06 17,103.58 17,196.57 17,287.05 17,381.04 36,047.13 18,694.08 18,825.95 20,964.12 21,115.33 21,963.78 29.09% 2.15% 7.82% 36.59%
0.53% 0.54% 0.53% 0.54% 107.39% -48.14% 0.71% 11.36% 0.72% 4.02%
1.62% 1.61% 1.62% 1.61% -105.24% 50.29% 1.45% -9.21% 1.43% -1.87%
Macusani 13,022.68 15,102.51 25,838.17 30,482.22 30,647.95 30,809.21 23,532.34 24,189.63 24,040.01 42,044.64 51,281.87 61,582.08 64,719.61 396.98% 14.30% 17.22% 27.63%
15.97% 71.09% 17.97% 0.54% 0.53% -23.62% 2.79% -0.62% 74.89% 21.97% 20.09% 5.09%
-1.68% -56.79% -3.68% 13.75% 13.77% 37.91% 11.50% 14.91% -60.60% -7.67% -5.79% 9.20%
8,902,941.00 8,906,809.23 8,794,732.97 8,566,237.72 9,547,696.35 8,894,196.70 9,006,563.35 9,285,489.44 9,551,362.15 9,889,382.22 9,153,654.00 9,584,664.87 9,633,537.63
N (C-R) ^ 2 / N Ave. (C-R) (Ave. (C-R)) ^ 2)((C-R)^2/N) - (Ave. (C-R)^2)Stan.Dev CAGR Mon.
Dorada 180 Days
Puno 0.84% 4.17% 5.47% 0.81% 1.30% -0.08% -2.35% -1.93% -3.81% -2.70% -4.26% 2.04%
0.0070% 0.1735% 0.2995% 0.0065% 0.0170% 0.0001% 0.0554% 0.0374% 0.1453% 0.0727% 0.1815% 0.0415% 12 0.09% 0.09% 0.00% 0.09% 2.94% 0.49%
Ayacucho -19.98% -39.95% -19.95% -173.37% 17.83% -19.04% -19.26% -16.38% -19.76% 78.34% -33.43% -36.18%
3.9902% 15.9613% 3.9804% 300.5576% 3.1783% 3.6265% 3.7108% 2.6834% 3.9028% 61.3679% 11.1783% 13.0925% 12 35.60% 35.60% 12.68% 22.93% 47.88% -18.55%
Ayaviri -0.72% -7.83% 2.21% 17.66% 4.18% -13.73% -3.69% -0.13% 7.50% -6.51% -0.71% -1.72%
0.0051% 0.6135% 0.0489% 3.1205% 0.1746% 1.8852% 0.1360% 0.0002% 0.5621% 0.4240% 0.0050% 0.0297% 12 0.58% 0.58% 0.00% 0.58% 7.62% 3.90%
Juliaca 11.69% 13.87% -8.12% -2.93% -1.25% 2.94% 7.27% -14.52% -3.31% 1.32% 4.97% -16.72%
1.3673% 1.9251% 0.6586% 0.0857% 0.0155% 0.0866% 0.5291% 2.1076% 0.1094% 0.0174% 0.2467% 2.7965% 12 0.83% 0.83% 0.01% 0.82% 9.07% 2.84%
ORC -40.51% -8.54% -11.12% 2.85% 16.54% 4.51% -13.05% 3.16% 14.74% 12.81% -7.06% 13.49%
16.4087% 0.7301% 1.2358% 0.0813% 2.7349% 0.2032% 1.7038% 0.1001% 2.1729% 1.6403% 0.4986% 1.8195% 12 2.44% 2.44% 0.06% 2.38% 15.44% 9.71%
Desagua. 1.62% 1.61% 1.62% 1.61% -105.24% 50.29% 1.45% -9.21% 1.43% -1.87%
0.0264% 0.0258% 0.0264% 0.0258% 110.7601% 25.2915% 0.0209% 0.8477% 0.0204% 0.0349% 10 13.71% 13.71% 1.88% 11.83% 34.39% 2.15%
Macusani -1.68% -56.79% -3.68% 13.75% 13.77% 37.91% 11.50% 14.91% -60.60% -7.67% -5.79% 9.20%
0.0281% 32.2511% 0.1353% 1.8910% 1.8959% 14.3750% 1.3230% 2.2242% 36.7227% 0.5890% 0.3353% 0.8465% 12 7.72% 7.72% 0.60% 7.12% 26.69% 14.30%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Dorada 180 Days Base Amount (Jun'12)_ CAGR Mon. Stan.Dev
Puno 7,712,798.08 0.49% 2.94% 7750889.865 7789169.777 7827638.744 7866297.701 7905147.587 7944189.343 7983423.917 8022852.263 8062475.336 8102294.098 8142309.517 8182522.563 8222934.212 8263545.445 8304357.248 8345370.611 8386586.531 8428006.006
Ayacucho 44,569.52 -18.55% 47.88% 36300.61176 29565.82019 24080.5232 19612.90415 15974.15496 13010.4968 10596.68117 8630.696699 7029.458027 5725.294478 4663.090203 3797.954905 3093.326706 2519.426994 2052.001933 1671.297459 1361.224446 1108.67876
Ayaviri 564,422.38 3.90% 7.62% 586420.9367 609276.8948 633023.6717 657695.9874 683329.9151 709962.934 737633.984 766383.5227 796253.5845 827287.8423 859531.671 893032.2141 927838.4523 964001.2757 1001573.558 1040610.232 1081168.374 1123307.284
Juliaca 873,486.62 2.84% 9.07% 898257.7219 923731.3046 949927.2894 976866.1631 1004568.993 1033057.444 1062353.796 1092480.959 1123462.495 1155322.633 1188086.289 1221779.085 1256427.371 1292058.243 1328699.568 1366379.999 1405129.005 1444976.889
ORC 351,577.64 9.71% 15.44% 385713.5585 423163.8542 464250.3317 509326.0409 558778.3104 613032.0759 672553.5317 737854.1365 809495.0083 888091.7461 974319.7196 1068919.873 1172705.089 1286567.181 1411484.545 1548530.58 1698882.899 1863833.458
Desagua. 21,963.78 2.15% 34.39% 22436.16776 22918.71544 23411.64155 23915.16931 24429.52674 24954.94675 25491.66727 26039.93135 26599.98726 27172.08862 27756.4945 28353.46954 28963.28406 29586.21422 30222.54209 30872.55584 31536.54982 32214.8247
Macusani 64,719.61 14.30% 26.69% 73971.40229 84545.75601 96631.73387 110445.4254 126233.8107 144279.1758 164904.1605 188477.5263 215420.75 246215.559 281412.5451 321641.0077 367620.2062 420172.2193 480236.6433 548887.3918 627351.8965 717033.0524
Total Dorada 180 Days 9753990.264 9882372.122 10018963.94 10164159.39 10318462.3 10482486.42 10656957.74 10842719.04 11040736.62 11252109.26 11478079.33 11720046.17 11979581.94 12258450.01 12558626.11 12882322.67 13232016.48 13610480.19
FORMA DE FECHA PLAZO FECHA May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12 May-12 Jun-12
Tasa PAGO DESEMBOLSO DIAS VENCIMIENTO CASH PAYMENTS 14,206.96 32,050.57 27,137.00 88,773.55 129,033.68 54,244.83 39,437.50 223,114.03 38,883.46 29,264.19 270,403.87 156,758.56 169,916.30 253,880.68
CASH PAYMENTS 22,250.10 25,818.38 29,545.09 96,557.00 26,782.61 26,737.69 196,785.60 26,436.64 24,754.08 263,235.01 156,653.59 166,931.86 252,396.47
7.50% MENSUAL 6/9/2011 365 6/8/2012 B.NACION 12,089.84 12,089.84 12,089.84 12,898.42 12,089.84 12,898.42 11,685.67 12,494.09 12,494.09 12,089.84 11,685.67
9.55% MENSUAL 6/10/2011 730 6/9/2013 COFIDE 10,160.26 13,728.54 17,455.25 14,595.49 14,692.77 13,839.27 13,455.01 13,942.55 12,259.99 12,288.06 12,289.92 11,880.59 10,354.29 11,758.91 10,629.93 9,216.18 10,407.16 9,047.01 8,914.86 8,478.92 7,258.76 6,607.76 7,830.00 6,691.91 5,632.57
9.50% TRIMESTRAL 7/21/2011 1,075 6/30/2014 COFIDE 36,119.84 42,795.75 39,334.73 35,395.59 32,518.18 29,410.57 23,318.18 21,238.48
9.65% TRIMESTRAL 8/5/2011 1,152 9/30/2014 DUE 14,433.46 23,559.97 21,596.64 19,415.07 17,866.45 16,230.70 12,979.85 12,041.98
9.65% TRIMESTRAL 8/25/2011 1,152 10/20/2014 FONDEMI 18,509.79 47,119.95 43,193.28 38,830.13 35,732.90 32,461.41 25,959.70 24,083.96
9.00% TRIMESTRAL 9/26/2011 1,080 9/10/2014 COFIDE 25,302.08 22,460.09 20,403.33 18,968.07 17,417.09 14,088.46 13,191.35
9.65% TRIMESTRAL 9/27/2011 1,080 9/11/2014 FONDEMI 32,867.17 29,155.47 26,210.34 24,119.71 21,911.45 17,522.80 16,256.67
9.75% MENSUAL 11/18/2011 1,080 11/2/2014 RESPONSABILITY 131,678.6 131,678.63 131,678.63
9.75% SEMESTRAL 10/21/2011 1,080 10/5/2014 RESPONSABILITY 132,678.0 132,678.00 132,678.00
8.65% TRIMESTRAL 12/28/2011 1,080 12/12/2014 COFIDE 27,078.79 24,266.28 22,777.73 21,167.47 17,386.46 16,611.96
9.65% TRIMESTRAL 12/20/2011 1,080 12/4/2014 FONDEMI 39,273.90 32,034.86 29,777.42 27,389.31 22,251.18 21,073.47
8.60% TRIMESTRAL 1/24/2012 1,080 1/8/2015 COFIDE 16,764.21 22,923.42 22,018.55 20,666.77 17,185.75 16,679.57
7.50% MENSUAL 5/4/2012 365 5/4/2013 B.NACION 23,372.64      22,563.16 23371.34 26,605.67 24,179.68 26,605.67 24,179.68 23,371.34 26,605.67 22,563.16
SHORT TERM BORROWING Difference in Pago 14,206.96      9,800.47       1,318.62       59,228.46         32,476.68        27,462.22        12,699.81     26,328.43         12,446.82         4,510.11       7,168.86            104.97           2,984.44       1,484.21         
Flat Commission COFIDE, 0.5% 50,000.00         19,000.00         6,250.00           5,500.00
OTROS (Short-Term Pago) 9,128.65        1,312.62        1,870.00           11,617.74         24,952.06        11,539.31      6,946.82           4,510.11 5,999.96 2,984.44        
Errores u Omisiones 671.82           6.00              7,358.46           1,858.94           2,510.16          1,160.50        20,078.43         0.00 1,168.90             104.97           1,484.21         
6.00% BIMENSUAL 5/12/2011 60 7/11/2011 BCP
6.00% BIMENSUAL 5/16/2011 62 7/17/2011 BCP
7.50% BIMENSUAL 5/5/2011 61 7/5/2011 BBVA
7.60% MENSUAL 7/15/2011 30 8/14/2011 BCP
7.60% MENSUAL 7/18/2011 30 8/17/2011 BCP
7.60% MENSUAL 7/19/2011 30 8/18/2011 BCP
7.60% MENSUAL 8/17/2011 30 9/16/2011 BCP
7.60% MENSUAL 8/18/2011 32 9/19/2011 BCP
8.00% MENSUAL 8/4/2011 32 9/5/2011 BCP
7.70% MENSUAL 9/20/2011 30 10/20/2011 BCP
7.70% MENSUAL 9/26/2011 30 10/26/2011 BCP
7.97% MENSUAL 12/14/2011 33 1/16/2012 BCP
7.97% MENSUAL 12/15/2011 32 1/16/2012 BCP
7.97% MENSUAL 12/28/2011 37 2/3/2012 BCP
7.97% MENSUAL 1/16/2012 60 3/16/2012 BCP
7.97% MENSUAL 4/27/2012 30 5/27/2012 BCP
OTROS BORROWING TOTAL COSTS
< 1 Month
FORMA DE FECHA PLAZO FECHA May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12 May-12 Jun-12 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11
Tasa PAGO DESEMBOLSO DIAS VENCIMIENTO PROVISIONADO 6,323.14 18,615.49 11,414.22 37,657.11 10,757.30 72,083.18 153,713.27 102,862.49 212,658.40 329,270.01 215,549.49 199,224.46 188,226.69 86,739.57 189,537.63 177,073.66 219,099.42 132,913.82 41,246.70 82,375.22 PROMEDIO PROVISION MENSUAL: 140,374.41
117,506.77 96,692.66
7.50% MENSUAL 6/9/2011 365 6/8/2012 B.NACION 8,455.23 1,607.77 2,009.92 1,205.71 1,607.77 803.72 13,302.83 1,607.77 803.72 1,205.71 1,607.77 0.00
9.55% MENSUAL 6/10/2011 730 6/9/2013 COFIDE 10,160.26 1,987.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 394.94 0.00 0.00 709.87 0.00 0.00 709.87 0 0.00 0
9.50% TRIMESTRAL 7/21/2011 1,075 6/30/2014 COFIDE 5,048.27 20,779.03 0.00 14,468.65 28,578.65 0.00 13,298.53 25,833.53 388.89 12,101.25 24,297.45 698.93 1,048.52 1,048.52 698.93 1048.52 698.93 0
9.65% TRIMESTRAL 8/5/2011 1,152 9/30/2014 DUE 6,675.53 0.00 7,964.39 15,732.25 0.00 7,300.69 14,182.99 213.28 6,636.99 13,326.84 383.95 6,360.29 575.99 383.95 575.99 383.95 0
9.65% TRIMESTRAL 8/25/2011 1,152 10/20/2014 FONDEMI 3,073.13 0.00 15,928.77 31,464.50 0.00 14,601.38 28,365.99 426.55 13,273.98 26,653.68 767.89 12,720.59 1,151.98 767.89 1151.98 767.89 0
9.00% TRIMESTRAL 9/26/2011 1,080 9/10/2014 COFIDE 1,053.79 9,254.94 17,249.70 0.00 7,596.36 14,753.84 224.30 6,978.24 14,008.46 407.92 6,755.77 611.96 407.92 611.96 407.92 0
9.65% TRIMESTRAL 9/27/2011 1,080 9/11/2014 FONDEMI 1,036.78 11,796.96 22,291.63 0.00 9,855.93 19,147.04 287.92 8,959.94 17,991.23 518.33 10,600.49 959.99 639.91 959.99 639.91 0
9.75% MENSUAL 11/18/2011 1,080 11/2/2014 RESPONSABILITY 0.00 8,389.55 30,183.36 52,152.48 72,864.17 95,176.59 116,940.11 9,089.86 30,183.36 52,152.48 74,298.30 95899.32 118397.02 7,689.43 29477.61
9.75% SEMESTRAL 10/21/2011 1,080 10/5/2014 RESPONSABILITY 7,042.53 28,279.66 50,398.35 72,694.95 93,715.40 116,360.42 4,927.86 26,858.72 48,250.08 70,529.40 92,987.93 114893.97 6337.46 27,569.10 49682.07
8.65% TRIMESTRAL 12/28/2011 1,080 12/12/2014 COFIDE 864.48 9,832.54 18,280.21 266.87 8,301.62 16,662.76 490.05 8,114.79 735.16 490.05 735.16 490.05 0
9.65% TRIMESTRAL 12/20/2011 1,080 12/4/2014 FONDEMI 4,228.27 16,208.52 27,502.22 351.90 10,951.03 21,989.28 639.91 8,586.40 777.59 518.33 777.59 518.33 0
8.60% TRIMESTRAL 1/24/2012 1,080 1/8/2015 COFIDE 1,766.03 9,112.67 252.12 7,842.52 15,740.96 473.74 7,844.62 710.70 473.74 710.7 473.74 0
7.50% MENSUAL 5/4/2012 365 5/4/2013 B.NACION 1,607.45 3,215.54 4,824.28 3,215.54 3215.54 1607.45 1,607.45 3215.54
SHORT TERM BORROWING
6.00% BIMENSUAL 5/12/2011 60 7/11/2011 BCP 2,367.78
6.00% BIMENSUAL 5/16/2011 62 7/17/2011 BCP 1,336.95
7.50% BIMENSUAL 5/5/2011 61 7/5/2011 BBVA 2,618.41
7.60% MENSUAL 7/15/2011 30 8/14/2011 BCP 978.26
7.60% MENSUAL 7/18/2011 30 8/17/2011 BCP 1,059.46
7.60% MENSUAL 7/19/2011 30 8/18/2011 BCP 733.40
7.60% MENSUAL 8/17/2011 30 9/16/2011 BCP 1,141.08 3,597.21
7.60% MENSUAL 8/18/2011 32 9/19/2011 BCP 794.60 2,636.32
8.00% MENSUAL 8/4/2011 32 9/5/2011 BCP 3,183.82
7.70% MENSUAL 9/20/2011 30 10/20/2011 BCP 1,031.33
7.70% MENSUAL 9/26/2011 30 10/26/2011 BCP 140.17
7.97% MENSUAL 12/14/2011 33 1/16/2012 BCP 1,813.86
7.97% MENSUAL 12/15/2011 32 1/16/2012 BCP 1,706.98
7.97% MENSUAL 12/28/2011 37 2/3/2012 BCP 364.36 4,143.10
7.97% MENSUAL 1/16/2012 60 3/16/2012 BCP 1,600.12 4,708.23
7.97% MENSUAL 4/27/2012 30 5/27/2012 BCP 703.15
OTROS BORROWING
< 1 Month 55.99 4,019.17 923.61
FORMA DE FECHA PLAZO FECHA May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12 May-12 Jun-12
Tasa PAGO DESEMBOLSO DIAS VENCIMIENTO NET IMPACT 6,323.14 -3,634.61 -14,404.16 8,112.02 -85,799.70 45,300.57 126,975.58 -93,923.11 186,221.76 304,515.93 -47,685.52 42,570.87 21,294.83 -165,656.90
7.50% MENSUAL 6/9/2011 365 6/8/2012 B.NACION -3,634.61 -10,482.07 -10,079.92 -11,692.71 -10,482.07 -12,094.70 1,617.16 -10,886.32 -11,690.37 -10,884.13 -10,077.90 0.00 0.00
9.55% MENSUAL 6/10/2011 730 6/9/2013 COFIDE -11,741.48 -17,455.25 -14,595.49 -14,692.77 -13,839.27 -13,455.01 -13,942.55 -12,259.99 -11,893.12 -12,289.92 -11,880.59 -9,644.42
9.50% TRIMESTRAL 7/21/2011 1,075 6/30/2014 COFIDE 5,048.27 20,779.03 -36,119.84 14,468.65 28,578.65 -42,795.75 13,298.53 25,833.53 -38,945.84 12,101.25 24,297.45 -34,696.66
9.65% TRIMESTRAL 8/5/2011 1,152 9/30/2014 DUE 6,675.53 -14,433.46 7,964.39 15,732.25 -23,559.97 7,300.69 14,182.99 -21,383.36 6,636.99 13,326.84 -19,031.12
9.65% TRIMESTRAL 8/25/2011 1,152 10/20/2014 FONDEMI 3,073.13 -18,509.79 15,928.77 31,464.50 -47,119.95 14,601.38 28,365.99 -42,766.73 13,273.98 26,653.68 -38,062.24
9.00% TRIMESTRAL 9/26/2011 1,080 9/10/2014 COFIDE 1,053.79 9,254.94 17,249.70 -25,302.08 7,596.36 14,753.84 -22,235.79 6,978.24 14,008.46 -19,995.41
9.65% TRIMESTRAL 9/27/2011 1,080 9/11/2014 FONDEMI 1,036.78 11,796.96 22,291.63 -32,867.17 9,855.93 19,147.04 -28,867.55 8,959.94 17,991.23 -25,692.01
9.75% MENSUAL 11/18/2011 1,080 11/2/2014 RESPONSABILITY 8,389.55 30,183.36 52,152.48 72,864.17 95,176.59 116,940.11 -122,588.77 30,183.36
9.75% SEMESTRAL 10/21/2011 1,080 10/5/2014 RESPONSABILITY 7,042.53 28,279.66 50,398.35 72,694.95 93,715.40 116,360.42 -127,750.14 26,858.72 48,250.08
8.65% TRIMESTRAL 12/28/2011 1,080 12/12/2014 COFIDE 864.48 9,832.54 18,280.21 -26,811.92 8,301.62 16,662.76 -23,776.23
9.65% TRIMESTRAL 12/20/2011 1,080 12/4/2014 FONDEMI 4,228.27 16,208.52 27,502.22 -38,922.00 10,951.03 21,989.28 -31,394.95
8.60% TRIMESTRAL 1/24/2012 1,080 1/8/2015 COFIDE 1,766.03 9,112.67 -16,512.09 7,842.52 15,740.96 -22,449.68
7.50% MENSUAL 5/4/2012 365 5/4/2013 B.NACION -21,765.19 -19,347.62
SHORT TERM BORROWING
6.00% BIMENSUAL 5/12/2011 60 7/11/2011 BCP 2,367.78
6.00% BIMENSUAL 5/16/2011 62 7/17/2011 BCP 1,336.95
7.50% BIMENSUAL 5/5/2011 61 7/5/2011 BBVA 2,618.41
7.60% MENSUAL 7/15/2011 30 8/14/2011 BCP 978.26
7.60% MENSUAL 7/18/2011 30 8/17/2011 BCP 1,059.46
7.60% MENSUAL 7/19/2011 30 8/18/2011 BCP 733.40
7.60% MENSUAL 8/17/2011 30 9/16/2011 BCP 1,141.08 3,597.21
7.60% MENSUAL 8/18/2011 32 9/19/2011 BCP 794.60 2,636.32
8.00% MENSUAL 8/4/2011 32 9/5/2011 BCP 3,183.82
7.70% MENSUAL 9/20/2011 30 10/20/2011 BCP 1,031.33
7.70% MENSUAL 9/26/2011 30 10/26/2011 BCP 140.17
7.97% MENSUAL 12/14/2011 33 1/16/2012 BCP 1,813.86
7.97% MENSUAL 12/15/2011 32 1/16/2012 BCP 1,706.98
7.97% MENSUAL 12/28/2011 37 2/3/2012 BCP 364.36 4,143.10
7.97% MENSUAL 1/16/2012 60 3/16/2012 BCP 1,600.12 4,708.23
7.97% MENSUAL 4/27/2012 30 5/27/2012 BCP 703.15
OTROS BORROWING
< 1 Month 55.99 4,019.17 923.61
